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Le Transport de Marchandises Dangereuses (TMD) est une activité génératrice de risques 
en raison de la dangerosité intrinsèque des produits considérés qui peuvent, suite à un accident 
dans le cadre de cette activité, provoquer des effets graves sur l’environnement, les biens et les 
personnes (effets toxiques, thermiques, de surpression, de pollution…). L’activité TMD se 
décompose en trois phases : le transport, la manutention (chargement/déchargement) et le 
stockage.  
Afin de comprendre les sources et les causes des risques générés par l’activité TMD au 
Maroc, nous avons fait une étude sur l'état d’art en ce qui concerne les matières dangereuses 
(MD) au sein du pays. Cette étude porte sur une enquête concernant les choix logistiques reliés 
aux matières dangereuses et adressée aux entreprises utilisant, fabriquant, stockant et/ou 
transportant des MD.  Les résultats de l’enquête permettront : 
▪ de positionner l’entreprise par rapport aux autres entreprises qui utilisent ou produisent 
des MD ; 
▪ de mieux comprendre le niveau de respect de l’ensemble des réglementations appliquées 
aux MD ; 
▪ d’identifier les besoins par rapport aux choix logistiques en vue de proposer des outils 
de gestion adaptés ; 
▪ d’aider à l’élaboration des guides qui répondent aux besoins concernant les 
réglementations MD et les critères de sélection de sous-traitants ainsi que la gestion de leurs 
contrats. 
Par ailleurs, nous avons enchainé par une étude de cas dont le but est de faire une analyse 
exhaustive sur les risques liés notamment aux (TMD) dans la région de Tanger- Tétouan-Al 
Hoceima afin de définir des scénarios d’accidents et pouvoir établir une méthode efficace de 
gestion. La problématique de ce travail consiste donc à évaluer le niveau de risque dans les 
zones concernées par le transport des matières dangereuses. 
Pour approcher cet objectif, on a procédé par une analyse quantitative des risques 
"Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)". Cette analyse est une méthodologie qui estime 
quantitativement le risque dans le transport de matières dangereuses en associant les 
conséquences des incidents et l'estimation des fréquences.  
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La méthodologie QRA dédiée au transport routier de matières dangereuses est une 
approche simplifiée comprenant : 
- L'analyse de fréquence réalisée en considérant des schémas d'arbres à événements 
présélectionnés pour les produits dangereux. 
-  L'analyse des conséquences basée sur la méthode innovante Short Cut & et le logiciel 
ALOHA (Areal Locations Of Hazardous Atmospheres) permettant de calculer les zones 
d'impact. En outre, des mesures de risques sociétales et des courbes FN ont été réalisées pour 
comparer le risque de transport d'essence, GPL (Butane & Propane) et du Chlore par camion-
citerne couvrant deux voies alternatives du port Tanger Med à Tanger et du Port Tanger Med à 
Tétouan au nord du Maroc. 
Les travaux de recherche de cette thèse ont été élargis pour aborder les risques dans le 
transport maritime des MD. Dans ce contexte, une étude détaillée a été réalisée sur le transport 
maritime de produits pétroliers dans la zone du Détroit de Gibraltar qui supporte un volume de 
trafic maritime important en tant que canal principal de liaison de navigation entre l’océan 
atlantique et la mer méditerranée.  Cette étude repose sur un modèle lagrangien de 
déversements, volontaires ou accidentels, d’hydrocarbures. Ce modèle permet la prévision de 
la zone d’impact de la marée noire et ces trajectoires à la surface de la mer. L'estimation de la 
probabilité d'accident et l'analyse des conséquences sont basées sur des données statistiques, 
sur l'occurrence d'un accident de déversement d'hydrocarbures, sur la probabilité des différentes 
tailles de rejet et sur la probabilité conjointe de la vitesse et de la direction du vent. 
L’ampleur des risques pour le littoral méditerranéen a été évaluée par la détermination du 
temps requit par la marée noire pour toucher les côtes en des points sensibles. Pour ce faire, on 
suppose qu’un éventuel accident de déversement de pétrole a eu lieu sur l'un des sites 
sélectionnés et localisés sur les routes maritimes typiques. Les résultats de cette étude peuvent 
être utilisés pour soutenir un processus décisionnel et/ou comme une base pour des analyses 
plus approfondies.  
Enfin, et pour illustrer l’aspect appliqué de nos travaux, nous avons effectué, en 
collaboration avec le terminal pétrolier du Port Tanger-Med Maroc, une étude concernant les 
risques dans la manipulation et le stockage des produits pétroliers. Il s’agit d’une approche 
systématique pour analyser les séquences et les inter-relations dans des incidents ou des 
accidents potentiels, en tenant compte de la chaîne logique, des événements dangereux critiques 
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et de leurs conséquences indésirables. Le modèle permet de quantifier les risques en établissant 


























































Preface and objectives 
 
Today, the number of industrial enterprises producing, using, storing and transporting 
hazardous materials is constantly increasing worldwide. This growth is linked to the progressive 
demand in various sectors, which makes our world riskier because of the nature and diversity 
of the dangerous events that may occur. 
 
The risks incurred by the hazardous materials transport activity, in case of the occurrence 
of an incident that may occur and have serious consequences for persons, the environment, 
property, a fire as an example accompanied by a release of toxic smoke, pollution of the soil 
and / or water, it can lead in case of non-control of the fire or the reactivity of the goods 
transported to an explosion. To this purpose, it is essential to protect the health and safety of 
personnel and to preserve the environment from any deterioration related to the risks incurred 
by the Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) business, which presents important issues for 
population, state and highly urbanized areas 
 
The aim of this thesis is to propose a systemic approach to risk assessment, taking into 
account in a global way the risks related to hazardous materials throughout the logistics chain 
(transport & storage). 
 
The approach consists of using the modeling and simulation techniques of an accident, to 
understand the consequences generated in the various scenarios in the event of the occurrence 
of a hazardous materials accident. This approach will allow the presentation of an industrial 
safety reasoning method based on actual case studies, rather than a detailed analysis of how to 
prevent and protect a given hazard. 
In the process of assessing the technological risks associated with the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods (TDG), the essential step is the evaluation of the risk intensity when an 
accidental event occurs, which is to quantify the risks involved. effects or impacts, in order to 
respond quickly and prioritize relief actions for the protection of the population and the 
environment. 
 
The assessment of the intensity of a technological risk can be carried out using an effects 
model, capable of estimating the effects induced by the hazardous phenomenon from a 
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quantitative point of view, in order to determine the geographical area of the hazard where the 
intensity of the risk is deemed too high. 
 
In this context, the first issue addressed in this thesis is to assess the level of risk of 
hazardous goods transport areas for both road and marine modes of transportation, while the 






















The Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) is a risk-generating activity because of the 
intrinsic danger of the products considered, which can, following an accident in this activity, 
cause serious effects on the environment, property or to the persons (toxic, thermal, 
overpressure, pollution ...). The TMD activity is divided into three phases: transport, handling 
(loading / unloading) and storage. 
In order to understand the sources and causes of the risks generated by the TDG activity 
in Morocco, we did a study on the state of art with regard to hazardous materials (HM) within 
the country. This study is based on a survey of logistical choices related to hazardous materials 
and addressed to companies using, manufacturing, storing and / or transporting HM. The results 
of the survey will allow: 
▪ position the company in relation to other companies that use or produce HMs; 
▪ better understand the level of compliance with all regulations applied to HMs; 
▪ identify needs in relation to logistics choices in order to propose adapted management 
tools; 
▪ assist in the development of guides that meet the requirements for MH regulations and 
subcontractor selection criteria and the management of their contracts. 
In addition, we have followed up with a case study whose aim is to make a comprehensive 
analysis of the risks related to (TDG) in the region of Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima in order to 
define accident scenarios and be able to establish an effective method of management. The 
problematic of this work is therefore to assess the level of risk in the areas concerned by the 
transport of hazardous materials. 
To achieve this goal, a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) was conducted. This 
analysis is a methodology that quantitatively estimates the risk in the transport of hazardous 
materials by combining the consequences of incidents and the estimation of frequencies. 
The QRA methodology for road transport of hazardous materials is a simplified approach that 
includes: 
▪ Frequency analysis performed considering preselected event tree schemes for hazardous 
products. 
▪ The impact analysis based on the innovative Short Cut & method and ALOHA (Areal 
Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) software for calculating impact zones. In 
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addition, societal risk measures and FN curves were performed to compare the risk of 
transporting gasoline, LPG (Butane & Propane) and tanker-borne chlorine covering two 
alternative routes from Tangier Med port to Tangier and Port Tanger Med in Tetouan in 
northern Morocco. 
The research work of this thesis has been expanded to address the risks in maritime 
transport of HMs. In this context, a detailed study was carried out on the maritime transport of 
petroleum products in the Strait of Gibraltar area, which supports a large volume of maritime 
traffic as the main navigation link between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. This 
study is based on a Lagrangian model of spills, voluntary or accidental, of hydrocarbons. This 
model allows the prediction of the impact zone of the spill and these trajectories on the sea 
surface. The estimate of the probability of accident and the analysis of the consequences are 
based on statistical data, on the occurrence of an oil spill accident, the probability of different 
rejection sizes, and the joint probability of wind speed and direction. 
The magnitude of the risks for the Mediterranean coast was assessed by determining the 
time required by the oil spill to touch the coast at sensitive points. To do this, it is assumed that 
a possible oil spill accident occurred on one of the selected sites and located on the typical 
shipping lanes. The results of this study can be used to support a decision-making process and 
/ or as a basis for further analysis. 
Finally, and to illustrate the applied aspect of our work, we carried out, in collaboration 
with the oil terminal of the Port Tanger-Med Morocco, a study concerning the risks in the 
handling and the storage of the petroleum products. This is a systematic approach to analyzing 
sequences and interrelations in potential incidents or accidents, taking into account the logical 
chain, critical hazard events and their undesirable consequences. The model quantifies risks by 











Outline of the thesis 
 
The first chapter sets out the general context and the problematic of our work. It is 
organized in three parts, the first part presents the general concepts of risks, in addition to a 
general historical overview of studies and approaches, exist for risk management. In the second 
part, we knew more about the hazardous materials and the different risks related to this kind of 
material as well as the regulations set for different modes of transport. The last part centered 
around the characteristics and risks of transporting petroleum products. 
The second chapter, devoted to the study of the state of the art of Morocco aims to 
evaluate the logistics strategy adopted by Moroccan companies in terms of dangerous 
substances. 
The third chapter presents our proposed approach for the risk assessment of the 
transportation of dangerous goods by road. This is a simplified approach to analyzing frequency 
and consequences. These analyzes should identify all relevant hazards covering the full range 
of potential incidents, taking into account the conditional probability of consequences arising 
from the occurrence of a hazardous materials accident (Gasoline and GPL). We chose the 
Tangier-Tétouan region as a case study to apply this approach. 
In the fourth chapter, we presented a Lagrangian-based maritime and coastal risk model 
for petroleum products spilled from shipping according to different meteorological and sea 
conditions. This model to determine the areas which may be affected in the event of an oil spill 
has been proposed. The proposed model aims at defining the risk and the prediction of oil drift 
and dispersion on the surface sea. This approach has been applied in the area of the Strait of 
Gibraltar, which supports a significant volume of maritime traffic because it represents the 
navigational connection channel between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. 
In the last chapter, we discuss the potential risks of facilities by describing the main likely 
accidents, their causes, their nature, and their consequences. This study includes a description 
of the analysis of the risks related to the facilities, products handled and the environment of the 
site. is conducted especially for a terminal of storage and distribution of hydrocarbons in the 



































I. Risk: Generality 
I.1.Risk Definition 
Risk is the measure of the instability of a dangerous or threatening situation and the 
potentiality of an incident, it is "a measure of economic loss, human injury or environmental 
damage, both in terms of probability of incident and magnitude of loss, injury and damage" 
(CCPS, 2000). It is often defined as the product between the frequency and severity of an event 
(Hwang et al., 2001), where the likelihood of an event occurring plays an important role in the 
risk assessment. 
The definitions of risk can be summarized in several categories based on the concept of 
risk (Aven 2010, 2012; Goerlandt et al., 2015) in the following table: 
Table1: The different definitions of risk  
Risk definition 
risk as the expected value of the probability of an event occurrence and 
the utility of the consequences 
Risk=Expected value 
 (R=EV) 
risk is defined risk as the probability of an undesirable event, or the 
chance of a loss. 
Risk=Probability of an 
(undesirable) event (R=P) 
risk is defined as objective uncertainty, i.e. a probability distribution 




represents definitions where risk is equal to uncertainty, understood as 
a statistical variation compared with an average value. 
Risk=Uncertainty (R=U) 
risk is defined as the possibility of an unfortunate occurrence Risk=Potential/possibility 
of a loss (R=PO) 
defines risk as the combination of the probability of occurrence of an 




understands risk as objective states of the world, which are considered 
existing independent of an assessor. 
Risk=Event or 
consequence R=C 
defines risk as the combination of events, consequences and the 
uncertainties of these, where uncertainty is understood as an assessor’s 
uncertainty about the occurrence of the events/consequences 
Risk=Consequences/dama




defines risk as an effect on stated objectives (i.e. a consequence), due 
to the presence of uncertainty. 
Risk=Effect of uncertainty 
on objectives R= EUO 
I.2. Risk Management 
Risk management is the set of actions used to analyze, evaluate, anticipate and treat risks. 
It is defined as: 
“Consists of a system dedicated to identifying and quantifying risks from processes or 
projects for appropriate decision-making to address risk” (Flanagan 1993); 
“Pertains to risk management planning processes: identification, analysis, reaction, 
steering and control” (Pritchard, 2014) ;  
“Define an architecture to manage risks in an efficient way” (AIRMIC, 2010) ; 
“A systematic approach for the identification, analysis and treatment of risks” (Mojtahedi 
et al.,  2010). 
Indeed, there are two main approaches to risk assessment: the qualitative approach and 
the quantitative approach (Benekos et al., 2017; Erkut, 2007).  
I.2.1. Qualitative approach 
The qualitative approach has been proposed for cases where numerical quantification of 
risk can not succeed because of the lack of information or the complexity of this task. 
Qualitative risk analysis identifies hazards as well as potential accidents and qualitatively 
assesses consequences, frequencies and risks. The main qualitative methods dedicated to risk 
analysis and management are: 
▪ Check list: Is a systemic method that verifies a system's compliance with a set of criteria 
that ensure its proper functioning. This method is applicable to all activities, systems, equipment 
and human interventions (Marhavilas, 2011); 
▪ Assumptions analysis: Based on expert brainstorming for specification of assumptions 
about possible deviations of a system and estimation of their potential consequences. This 
makes it possible to prioritize the risks and to define the appropriate countermeasures to deal 
with these deviations (Reniers et al., 2005; Marhavilas, 2011); 
▪ Security Audit: Is a set of applied procedures for inspection of facilities and processes 
(Reniers et al., 2005). This method is usually conducted by an external team to objectively 
verify the level of risk prevention and existing protections; 
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▪ Task Analysis: Is a method dedicated to the analysis of the risks engendered by human 
errors. Its purpose is to compare the skills of task operators with the needs of the system. 
▪ Hierarchical task analysis:  Represents an improvement in the traditional task analysis 
method. The purpose of this method is to prioritize complex tasks into several sub-tasks to 
facilitate risk analysis (Doytchev et al., 2009); 
▪ HAZOP: Is a structured method whose purpose is to determine the operating deviations 
of a system and which are likely to generate risks. for this, HAZOP is based on individual and 
collective brainstorming conducted by a multidisciplinary team (NL Rosing et al., 2010; 
Skelton, 1997). 
I.2.2. Quantitative approach 
Quantitative methods consider risk as a quantity estimable by mathematical relationships 
by exploiting real data (Marhavilas et al., 2011). As a result, the quantification of a risk requires 
a capitalization of knowledge over time. 
The conventional formula used for quantitative risk assessment is based on the 
specification of the probability of occurrence of an event and the degree of its impact: 
  
Risk = Probability of occurrence × Consequences 
Quantitative methods allow a numerical assessment of the level of risk based generally 
on the combination of its probability of occurrence and the degree of its impact. The main 
quantitative methods of risk management are: 
▪ Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA): QRA is a method for the quantification of risks that 
is based on the assessment of the probability and consequences of a risk event (Pasman et al., 
2013); 
▪ Proportional Risk-Assessment Technique (PRAT) is a risk quantification method based 
on the determination of the probability of occurrence, the frequency of exposure and the 
severity of the consequences of a risk (Marhavilas et al., 2011); 
▪ Quantitative assessment of a domino effect scenarios: is a method dedicated to the 
quantification of risks related to adverse events that may progress and trigger new risks (Najib 
2017); 
▪ Weighted Risk Analysis (WRA) makes it possible to compare several risks in one 
dimension. It is appropriate to balance the safety aspect with other aspects (Marhavilas et al., 
2011; Suddle 2009). 
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There is a semi-quantitative or hybrid approach. The latter is based on the combination 
of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to risk treatment for rigorous evaluation. For 
this purpose, a qualitative method can be used to define risk evolution scenarios and to establish 
an initial estimate. Afterwards, a quantitative method can be applied for a precise quantification 
of the risks. The main method has this context: 
▪ Failure tree analysis: This method is based on a deductive reasoning to determine the 
causes of the triggering of an adverse event. It makes it possible to establish logical links 
between the events that generate the risks. (Najib 2017); 
▪ Analysis of the event tree: This method is based on an inductive reasoning to determine 
the consequences generated by an initial event. Conducting this analysis leads to a qualitative 
description of risk evolution scenarios (Marhavilas et al., 2011). The hybridization of this 
method involves the specification of the probabilities of occurrence of events; 
▪ Analysis of Failure Modes Effects and Consequences "AMDEC" which allows the 
analysis and prioritization of failures associated with processes and products. It is an iterative, 
multi-phase method that covers analysis, evaluation and processing (Nimanbeg et al., 2011) ; 
▪ Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point "HACCP" represents a safety process for 
eliminating food preparation defects. To do this, it determines the critical points of the 
production process and integrates measures to control the quality of products at critical points 
(Efstratiadis et al., 2000). 
In the frame of hazmat transport, risk as indicated in (Alp, 1995) is a measure of the 
probability and severity of harm to an exposed receptor ( person , the environment) due to 
potential undesired events involving a hazmat. Due to this, a lot of research has been done in 
this context, where the risk Assessment increased interest in studying the different 
transportation modes such as road, rail and marine. The table 2 represents some studies related 
to Hazardous Materials Hazard Assessments, and table 3 provides a summary of the academic 
literature consisting of different aspects of the risk assessment related to hazardous materials 
problem in different transportation mode (Ditta et al., 2018; Erkut 2007). 
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Table 2: some studies related to Hazardous Materials Hazard Assessments 
Risk assessment studies. Reference 
Present an analysis of the risks linked to the transportation of liquefied petroleum gas 'LPG' in Italy. (Bubbico et al., 2000) 
Provide an assessment tool of risks related to the transport of dangerous goods by road, rail (Bubbico et al., 2004) 
a risk analysis related to the land transport of hazardous materials in Sicily, by road, railway, and intermodal (combined rail-
road) transport. 
(Bubbico et al., 2006) 
Studying the impact of passive protection on the reduction of the risk related to the transportation of LPG by road and rail. (Paltrinieri et al., 2009) 
Introduces the relevance of a systematic approach for the identification, quantification and mitigation of risk and presents a 
practical framework for risk management for the Petroleum Supply Chain. 
(Fernandes et al., 2010) 
develops a methodology dedicated to analyzing in a semi qualitative method and it resting on the analysis multi-criteria and 
on the probability to determine the risks bound to the land transportation of hazardous materials. 
( Reniers et al., 2010) 
a proposal to define risks relating to the transport of hazardous materials at a strategic, tactical, operational and real-time 
level. 
(Bersani et al., 2012) 
applied the HAZAN method to analyze the risks associated with the transport of hazardous materials in western India. (Chakrabarti et al., 2012) 
proposed an approach to map the risk related to hazardous materials transport by different modes in Flanders based on 
historical data. 
(Raemdonck et al.,  2013) 
proposes an iterative procedure based on chaos theory on dynamic risk definition to determine the best route for transporting 
hazardous materials 
(Mahmoudabadi et al., 
2014) 
proposed an approach to studying a dynamic exposure-based schedule for hazardous material transport by trains (Bersani et al., 2016) 
developed a fuzzy bilevel programming model for minimizing the total expected transportation risk when delivering products 
of hazardous materials to customers from multiple depots. 
(Du et al., 2017) 
a Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) methodology based on a simplified approach dedicated to hazmat road transport of 
gasoline by tank trucks. 




Table 3: a summary of the academic literature consisting of different aspects of the risk assessment related to hazardous materials problem in 
different transportation mode 
Risk assessment 
Road 
(Su et al.,2018; Xing et al., 2018; Soussi et al., 2018; Cordeiro et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2015; Qiu et al., 2015; Knoope et al., 2014; Xin 
et al., 2014; Shen et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2014; Rebelo et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2013; Tena-chollet et al., 2013; W.Y. Szeto, 2013; 
Roncoli et al., 2013; Chakrabarti et al., 2013; Das et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012; Chakrabarti et al., 2012; Hangxi et al., 2011; 
Chakrabarti et al., 2011; Francesca et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010; Rashid et al., 2010; Gumus, 2009; Kheirkhah et al., 2009; Qiao et 
al., 2009; Trépanier et al., 2009; Francesca et al., 2009; Clark et al.,2009; Kawprasert et al., 2009; Efroymson et al., 2008; Taylor et 
al., 2008; M. D. Abkowitz et al., 2003; L. NARDINI et al., 2003; Jonkman et al., 2003; Fabiano et al., 2002; Hollister et al., 2002; 
Saccomanno et al., 2002; Verter et al., 2001; Hwang et al., 2001b; Leonelli et al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2000; Pet-armacost et al.,1999; 
Cassini, 1998; Mills et al.,1998; Cutter et al., 1997; Pine, 1997; Groothuis et al.,1997; Lovett, 1997; Alp et al., 1996; M. D. Abkowitz 
et al., 1996; Verter et al.,1996; Jayajit et al.,1996; Erkut et al., Verter, 1995; Spadoni et al., 1995; Moore et al., 1995; Macgregor et al., 
1994; Gregory et al., 1994; Harwood et al., 1993; For et al., 1993; Glickman, 1991; M. Abkowitz, 1990; M. Abkowitz,1988) 
Rail 
(Liu et al., 2014; Rapik et al., 2014; Mahmoudabadi et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2013; Bagheri et al., 2012; Lai et al., 2011; Verma., 2011; 
Cheng et a.l, 2011; Kawprasert et al., 2010; Bagheri et al., 2010; Hassan et al., 2010; Vlies et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2004; Barkan 
et al., 2001; Orr et al., 1998; Mcneill et al., 1991; Trust et al., 1991; Monaghan et al., 1990; SACCOMANNO et al., 1989; Swoveland, 
1987; Glickman et al.,1984; Glickman, 1983) 
Marine 
( Wang et al., 2016; Carr et al., 2015; Siddiqui et al., 2013; Dorp et al., 2011; Brito et al., 2009; Bubbico et al., 2000; Iakovou, 2001; 
Roelevenatb et al., 1995; Hans et al., 1995;) 
Multimodal 
( Vianello et al., 2016; Strogen et al., 2016; Lu et al., 2015; Iesmantas et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Vianello et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 
2014; Bagheri et al., 2014; Bonvicini et al., 2014; L. Ma, Cheng et al., 2013; Jamshidi et al., 2013; Sengul et al., 2012; Nathanail et 
al., 2010; Vincent et al., 2010; Genserik Reniers et al., 2010; Han et al., 2010; Bubbico et al., 2009; Sosa et al., 2009; Brown et al.,  
2007; Samuel, 2007; Milazzo et al., 2002; ; Lafrance-linden et al., 2001; Andersson, 1994; Saccomanno et al.,1993; Purdy, 1993; 
Aerde et al., 1988) 
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II. Dangerous goods 
II.1. Definition 
Hazardous materials are all substances that pose a risk to the security of persons and 
property. The dangerous aspect of these products is due to several facts, in particular the nature 
of their composition or the properties of storage, transport, loading, unloading and packing 
(Rechkoska et al., 2012).These goods can be transported in liquid form (hydrocarbons, chlorine, 
propane, ...), solid (explosives, ammonium nitrate, ...) and gas (compressed coal gas…). These 
substances often have a higher concentration and aggressiveness than domestic ones. 
 
According to Moroccan Law No. 30-05 concerning the transport of dangerous goods by 
road, proposes the following definition for a dangerous substance:" any material, object or 
organism which, by its nature, may be prejudicial to persons, property or to the environment" 
(Gouvernment of Morocco, 2011). 
II.2.  Classification of Dangerous goods 
Since 1992, the United Nations has developed its own Globally Harmonized System 
(GHS) (Nations Unies, 2013) for the classification and labeling of chemicals according to the 
extent of their impact in order to standardize symbols and warnings of risks and caution between 
country. 
The purpose of this classification is to standardize the regulations for the transport and 
storage of hazardous materials in relation to their classes. In addition, it specifies labels to 
display on packages, containers, and conveyances. These labels facilitate the recognition of 
classes of dangerous goods and provide basic information about the risks they may pose. This 
classification also determines the compatibilities between the products and the rules of 
segregation to be respected when storing chemicals of different classes. 
Hazardous materials must be classified according to their degree of danger. This hazard(s) 
presented by a material must be determined on the basis of its physical and chemical 
characteristics and physiological properties. 
In the CLP Regulation (European Chemicals Agency, 2019), new methods associated 
with new criteria lead to much more detailed classification of the physical hazards of substances 
and mixtures. These methods and criteria are inspired by those used in the field of transport. 
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The application of the CLP Regulation involves, in the case of physical hazards, the 
transition from five hazard categories into the European classification system that pre-exists 
sixteen hazard classes. Some hazard categories are changed and new hazard classes appear. 
Hazardous materials (including mixtures and solutions) are classified into the nine classes 
according to their risks. Some of these classes are subdivided into divisions. These classes and 
divisions are as follows (Nations Unies, 2013): 
◼ Class 1: Explosive substances and objects 
Substances characterized by their instability, incompatibility and high reactivity, and subject to 
violent reactions when subjected to shock, heat or moisture. 
 
Table 4: classification of hazardous materials for Class: explosive 
 


















































































Danger of mass explosion in 

















◼ Class 2: Gases 
This class covers pure gases, gas mixtures, mixtures of one or more gases with one or more 
other substances and articles containing such materials. We hear a matter that: 
▪ At 50 ° C at a vapor pressure above 300 kPa (3 bar); or 
▪ Is completely gaseous at 20 ° C at the standard pressure of 101.3 kPa. 
a- Flammable gases (including chemically unstable gases) 
Includes all products that can catch fire when exposed to heat, spark, or flame. 
































Hazard Extremely flammable gas H220 


















Additional danger statement 
Can explode even in the 













Additional danger statement 
May explode even in the 
absence of air at high 




*Hazard statements the hazard statements describe the nature of the hazard, or even the degree of hazard. A unique 
alphanumeric code is assigned to each hazard statement. It consists of: the letter "H" (for "Hazard statement"; three 
digits the first digit indicates the type of hazard: "2" for physical hazards; "3" for health hazards; "4" for environmental 
hazards the next two digits correspond to a sequential hazard numbering. For example, codes 200 to 210 are reserved 
for the danger of explosions 
 
b-  Non-flammable, non-toxic gases. 




























Hazard -Extremely flammable gas 
 
-Container under pressure: 














-Container under pressure: 
may burst under the effect 
of heat 
3 no pictogram 
 
warning -Container under pressure: 





c- Oxidizing gases 
Any substance that may cause or promote the combustion of another material by 
releasing oxygen or other oxidizing material or that contains an organic substance having the 
following bivalent oxygen structure: "-0-0-"(Peroxydes). 























Danger May cause or 





d- Gas under pressure 
Includes any product, material or substance that is under pressure and may explode 
when the container is subjected to heat or shock. 
 





































warning Contains gas under 
pressure; may explode 





warning Contains gas under 
pressure; may explode 





warning Contains refrigerated gas; 
may cause cryogenic 





warning Contains gas under 
pressure; may explode 






◼ Class 3: Flammable liquids 
Flammable liquids: are liquids, liquid mixtures, or liquids containing solids in solution or 
suspension that emit flammable vapors at a temperature not exceeding 60 ° C in a crucible or 
65.6 ° C in an open crucible; this temperature is commonly called a flash point. Class 3 includes 
the following subjects: 
- Flammable liquids 
- Liquid desensitized explosive substances. 










































warning Flammable liquid and vapor H226 
4 No 
pictogram  




◼ Class 4: Flammable solids 
Class 4 consists of the following three divisions: 
 (a). Flammable solids: are substances which, under the conditions encountered during 
transport, ignite easily or which may cause or aggravate a fire by friction; self-reactive materials 
likely to undergo a strongly exothermic reaction; desensitized explosive substances which may 
explode if not sufficiently diluted; 
 (b). Substances subject to spontaneous ignition: are substances liable to spontaneously 
heat up under normal conditions of transport, or to heat up in contact with the air, and which 
may then ignite; 
 (c). Substances which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases: Substances which, 



































Danger Flammable solid H228 
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Danger Flammable solid H228 
 



































May not be 
accepted for 
carriage 






Danger May ignite or explode under 
the effect of heat 
 
H241 
Type C & 
D 
  




Type E & 
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Type G no pictogram Not prescribed No warning 
mention 



































































Hazard In contact with 
water releases 
flammable gases 


















◼ Class 5: Oxidizing substances and organic peroxides 
       Class 5 includes the following two divisions: 
(a). Oxidizing substances: which, although not necessarily combustible themselves, can, in 
general by giving up oxygen, cause or encourage the combustion of other materials. These 
materials can be contained in objects; 
(b). Organic peroxides: are the organic materials containing the bivalent structure -O-O- and 
can be considered as derivatives of hydrogen peroxide, in which one or two hydrogen atoms 
are replaced by organic radicals. Organic peroxides are thermally unstable materials, which can 
undergo an exothermic self-accelerating. 







































Danger May cause a fire; oxidizer H272 
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Danger May aggravate a fire; oxidizer H272 
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Hazard May expose under 





Danger May ignite or 
explode under the 






Hazard May ignite under 






Warning May ignite under 
the effect of heat 
 
H242 
Type G No 
pictogram 







◼ Class 6: Toxic and infectious substances 
Any substance that in one exposure can lead to death. Class 6 includes the following two 
divisions: 
 (a). Toxic substances: are substances that can cause death or serious disorders, or be 
harmful to human health if they are absorbed by ingestion, inhalation or dermal; 
 (b).  Infectious Substances: These are materials known or suspected to contain pathogens. 
Pathogens are defined as microorganisms (including bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, parasites and 











































Danger Deadly if swallowed H300 
Cutaneous Deadly in contact  
With skin 
H310 
Inhalation Inhalational death H330 
2 Oral 
  
Danger Deadly if swallowed H300 
Cutaneous Deadly in contact  
With skin 
H310 
Inhalation Inhalational death H330 
3 Oral 
  
Danger Deadly if swallowed H301 
Cutaneous Deadly in contact  
With skin 
H311 





Warning Harmful if swallowed H302 
Cutaneous Deadly in contact with 
skin 
H312 
Inhalation Harmful by ingestion H332 




Warning May be harmful if 
swallowed 
H303 
Cutaneous May be harmful by 
skin contact 
H313 
Inhalation May be harmful if 
inhaled  
H333 
      
◼ Class 7: Radioactive material 
 
Radioactive material means any material containing radionuclides for which both the 
mass activity and the total activity in the consignment exceed the basic values for radionuclides. 
 
◼ Class 8: Corrosive substances 
Corrosive substances are those materials which, by chemical action, can cause serious 
damage to living tissue and which, in case of leakage, may damage or even destroy other goods 





































warning Causes severe 

















◼ Class 9: Miscellaneous Hazardous Materials and Objects 
The substances and articles of Class 9 are substances and articles which, during transport, 
present a danger other than that referred to in other classes. 
II.3. Regulation of the Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) 
The transport of dangerous goods is governed by strict international regulations - (issued 
from UN recommendations) - and specific to each mode of transport: 
▪ Transport by land: ADR (European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage 
of Dangerous Goods by Road), RID (Regulation concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail), (rail) and ADN (European Agreement on International Transport) 
dangerous goods by inland waterway (fluvial); 
▪ Maritime transport: IMDG (International Maritime Dangerous Goods); 
▪ Air transport: is governed by the IATA rules (International Air Transport 
Association,). 
a) Road transport 
Road TDG is governed by the ADR (European Agreement on the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Road) (Nations Unies, 2019), (which was adapted in Moroccan law by 
the Decree of 29 May 2009 (TDG Order) (Gouvernment of Morocco, 2011)). 
This European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 
Road (ADR) was obtained in Geneva on 30 September 1957 under the auspices of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which came into force on 29 January 1968. 
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The agreement covers all land transport of dangerous goods, as well as all loading or unloading 
of these materials. The agreement contains technical rules relating to : 
• the definition of materials by classes, according to their risks (explosives, compressed 
or liquefied gases, flammable, toxic, radioactive, corrosive, etc.); 
• packaging (technical provisions, tests, approval procedure for packaging and distinctive 
marking); 
• tanks (construction, approval of prototypes and tests of resistance and sealing); 
• vehicles (electrical circuits, fire extinguishers, braking, speed limitation by construction, 
first intervention equipment, certificate of approval); 
• labeling and signage, so that emergency and response services are immediately 
informed of the presence of hazardous materials. Vehicles must have rectangular orange panels. 
For tanks, this sign contains the hazard code (2 for compressed or liquefied gases, 3 for 
flammable, 6 for toxic, etc.), as well as the material number. 
There are also danger labels bearing a danger symbol (flame for flammable, human skull 
for toxic, helix for radioactive ...). 
The parking and unloading rules are also specified as well as the different risks (and their 
consequences) listed in the ADR order. 
 
b) Rail transport: 
Rail TDG is covered by RID, the regulation concerning the international carriage of 
dangerous goods by rail (OTIF, 2019). 
In order to guarantee everyone's safety and preserve the environment, RID establishes the 
list of so-called dangerous goods; those that are excessively dangerous can not travel by rail. 
The others can, provided that several rules are respected, loading until final delivery. Each 
of the 13 classes of dangerous goods is subject to specific provisions. 
The obligations incumbent on the shipper and the carrier of dangerous goods are listed in 
RID. They concern in particular (OTIF, 2019): 
⦁ the safety measures to be taken when loading and unloading the dangerous goods ; 
⦁ all the checks to be done before the wagon is sent ; 
⦁ transport information : the driver must be aware of the contents of the load and its 
dangerousness, wagons must be placarded, etc..; 
⦁ parking conditions and transportation ; 
⦁ the measures to be taken in case of incident or accident. 
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c) Maritime transport: 
The transport of dangerous goods by sea is governed by the International Maritime 
Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) (IMO, 2018). Very precise packaging and 
documentation standards must be followed. Each shipment is inspected prior to boarding and 
may be subject to rejection resulting in delays and loss of trade. 
Products normally exempt from land transport regulations are regulated for maritime 
transport (ex: aerosols, perfumes, combustible liquids, etc.). In addition, specific standards of 
segregation are implemented. 
II.4. Risks related to hazardous materials 
Dangerous Goods (TD) are transported in different ways around the world. The risk of 
TDG refers to the consequences of an accident occurring during the transportation of these 
goods by road, rail, waterway or pipeline. The main categories of risks related to the transport 
of dangerous goods (ELAbde, 2015): 
▪ the explosion hazard, which is a result of rapid combustion generating a large amount 
of gas at such a high temperature, pressure and expansion speed as to cause damage to the 
surroundings; 
▪ the risk of fire, which corresponds to a reaction resulting from the presence of several 
factors (heat source, oxidizer, fuel) and which causes a significant release of heat, resulting in 
burns or injuries that are often very serious; 
▪ the toxic risk, which can cause poisoning or even death, by inhalation, contact or 
ingestion of a toxic chemical substance following a leak of toxic products. The dispersion of 
the hazardous material can be done in air, water and / or soil. In the aerial case, the toxic cloud 
will move away from the accident site in response to active winds; 
▪ the risk of radioactivity in the case of materials emitting dangerous radiations that 
can reach all living beings; 
▪ infectious risk, which can cause serious diseases in living beings. This risk is specific 
to materials containing infectious micro-organisms such as viruses, bacteria, .... 
  At the environmental level, the environmental impacts are generally much more 
complex to measure and quantify because it can take several years before their effects appear 
and may have as their target the fauna, the flora, the soil and / or water (Peignier, 2010),for 
example, in Seveso, Italy, on July 10, 1976, a cloud containing dioxin escaped from a plant 
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causing heavy damage to the surrounding flora and fauna (70,000 killed heads, defoliated trees) 
(Henkel, 2018). 
III. Hydrocarbons 
Hydrocarbons are complex mixtures of chemical compounds, their molecules contain 
only carbon and hydrogen; they are grouped into several chemical families according to their 
structure based on the quadrivalence of carbon as shown in the table 17 (Wauquier, 1994) : 
• Saturated hydrocarbons (Alkanes): are the family of molecules composed only of 
carbon and hydrogen. Normal paraffins called N-paraffins (linear alkanes) or iso-paraffins 
(branched alkanes) are distinguished; 
▪ Unsaturated hydrocarbons: which has at least two carbon atoms connected by a 
multiple bond (double or triple). There are: alkenes (olefins) (CnH2n) and alkynes (CnH2n-2); 
▪ Naphthenes: they consist of at least one benzene ring with 6 carbon atoms. The smallest 
and most volatile compounds are benzenes, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene; 
▪ Aromatic hydrocarbons: they are, as their name indicates, constituted of at least 2 
benzene cycles and constitute between 0% and 60% of the hydrocarbon composition. 
Table 17: Structure of hydrocarbon compounds present in petroleum products  
Source : (Laxalde, 2012) 
Families N-Paraffins Iso-Paraffins Alkene Naphtalene Aromatic 
Formulas CnH2n+2 CnH2n+2 CnH2n CnH2n CnH2n-8k 
Examples 
 
   
 
n : number of carbon atoms,  k : number of unsaturation 
III.1. Characteristics of hydrocarbons 
◼ The flash point: This is the temperature at which a product releases enough vapor to form a 
flammable mixture with air in contact with a flame or spark. Flash points for petroleum products 
are highly variable, they can easily ignite as long as the volatile compounds have not evaporated 
and are dispersed in the atmosphere (Fingas, 2013). The flash point is expressed in degrees 




Table 18: Specificities of liquid fuels (Source: Total)  
Combustibles Flash point (°C) LEL (%)* UEL (%)* 
Gasoline -35 1 7 
petroleum 35 à 60 0.7 5 
Diesel > 55 6 13.5 
Acetone 18 2.6 13 
Benzene 11 1.4 7 
Kerosene 37 0.7 5 
Toluene 4 1.4 6.7 
Crude -10 1 18 
* LEL (Lower Explosive Limit) and LES (Upper Explosive Limit) 
◼ The density of hydrocarbons corresponds to the mass per unit volume. This property 
is used to distinguish light and heavy hydrocarbons. It is also important for indicating the 
buoyancy of hydrocarbons in the water in the event of a spill (CEAEQ, 2015). In fact, 
hydrocarbons almost always have a density of less than 1g/cm3, which allows them to float. 
However, once spilled, aging phenomena (evaporation and especially emulsification) gradually 
increase their density to values close to those of brackish or fresh water, which makes their 
buoyancy more uncertain (Cedric, 2012); 
◼ Viscosity can be defined as the resistance to the flow of a liquid. As a result, in the 
event of a spill accident, it influences the spread of a layer of hydrocarbons on the surface of 
the water. Petroleum hydrocarbons with low viscosity are very fluid and spread rapidly, making 
their containment difficult. It is important to note that viscosity is influenced by temperature. 
Indeed, the lower the temperature, the higher the viscosity (CEAEQ, 2015); 
◼ Pour point: is defined by the temperature at which the product begins to flow. In the 
case of hydrocarbons, when the ambient temperature is below this point, the hydrocarbon 
behaves like a solid (Cedric, 2012); 
◼ Solubility: The ability of a substance to dissolve in the water column. This property is 
important in hydrocarbons because some, once solubilized, can be toxic to aquatic organisms, 
even at very low concentrations (Fingas, 2013); 
The most soluble petroleum hydrocarbons are essentially light aromatics such as benzene. 
Moreover, the greater the proportion of light hydrocarbons, the greater the solubility of the 
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petroleum product in water (CEAEQ, 2015). The table below represents the properties of some 
petroleum products (Fingas, 2013). 
Table 19: Properties of the main petroleum hydrocarbons  
Property Gasoline Diesel 
Crude oil 
Lightweight Heavy 
Flash point (°C) -35 >55 -30 to 30 -30 to 60 
Density g/ml (15°C) 0.72 0.84 0.78 to 0.88 0.88 to 1.00 
API Density (API degree) * 65 35 30 to 50 10 to 30 
Viscosity (mPa.s (15°c)) 0.5 2.0 5 to 50 50 to 50,000 
Pour point (°C) - -35 à -10 -40 to 30 -40 to 30 
Solubility mg/l 200 40 10 10 to 50 5 to 30 
*The density scale of the American Petroleum Institute (API) is commonly used to describe the 
density of petroleum hydrocarbons, which is then expressed in API degree (API: it's a measure of 
the heaviness or liquidity of a petroleum liquid is compared to water). 
III.2. Risks related to the transport of hydrocarbons 
The risk of transporting hazardous materials, specific to hydrocarbons, is the result of an 
accident occurring during the transport of these substances by road, rail, sea or pipeline. There 
are three types of effects that can be associated: 
◼ Explosion:  may be caused by a shock with spark production (especially for 
flammable gas tanks), by heating a tank of volatile or compressed product, by the mixing of 
several products or by the unexpected ignition of artifices or ammunition. The explosion can 
have both thermal and mechanical effects (effect of overpressure due to the shock wave). These 
effects are felt near the disaster and up to a radius of several hundred meters; 
The main consequences of the explosion can be: 
▪ Flammable vapor cloud which is within the flammable limits of the fluid; 
▪ Explosions can be confined or unconfined; 
▪ Confined explosions are far more hazardous; 
▪ Degree of confinement increases flame speed; 




Figure 1: The possible consequences of an explosion accident of a tanker truck 
(source: Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition- France) 
◼ A fire can be caused by the abnormal heating of a vehicle organ, an impact against 
an obstacle (with sparks), the accidental ignition of a leak, an explosion in the immediate 
vicinity of the vehicle, even a sabotage Indeed, 60% of TDG accidents involve flammable 
liquids. A fire of solid, liquid or gaseous flammable products generates thermal effects (burns), 
which can be aggravated by problems of asphyxiation and intoxication, related to the emission 
of toxic fumes (Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition- France, 2019); 
The main consequences of the flammable can be: 
➢ Pool Fire 
▪ Flammable liquid spilled on land / water;  
▪ Storage tank roof fire ; 
▪ Confined area (tank size, or containment bund), or unconfined; 









Figure 2: Pool fire consequence of an accident of HM 
(source: Pierre Palmberg) 
➢ BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) : 
▪ Failure of pressure vessel containing pressurised liquid; 
▪ Pressure drop causes violent boiling, rapid expansion and vaporisation ; 
▪ Typically occurs due to external heat source from other process emergency (e.g. jet fire) 
impinging on vessel; 
▪ Flammable liquids lead to fireball; 
▪ Flame spreads through 360° ; 














Figure 3: BLEVE consequence of an accident of HM 






➢ Jet Fire 
▪ Pressurised release of flammable liquid or vapor;  
▪ Intentional (flare); 
▪ Accidental (leak, relief valve); 
▪ Jet is pointed in one direction; 
▪ Can be affected by wind.  
 
      Figure 4:Jet fire consequence of an accident of HM 
                                                                        (source: Pierre Palmberg) 
 
◼ A toxic cloud release can be from a leak of toxic or result from combustion (even a 
non-toxic). When spread through the air, water and / or soil, hazardous materials can be toxic 
by inhalation, direct or indirect ingestion, consumption of contaminated products, contact. 
Depending on the concentration of the products and the duration of exposure, the symptoms 
range from simple irritation of the skin or a tingling sensation of the throat, to serious attacks 
(asphyxia, pulmonary edema). These effects can be felt up to a few kilometers from the site of 
the disaster. 
The main consequences of the toxic scenario can be: 
The different methods to categorise toxic effect: (Toxicity varies from chemical to chemical) 
▪ Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) (60 minutes) 
❖ ERPG 1 – Mild effects, objectionable odor 
❖ ERPG 2 – Serious health effects 
❖ ERPG 3 – Life threatening health effects 
▪ Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) (30 minutes) 













Figure 5: toxic consequence of an accident of release of toxic chemicals 





























Chapter II: State of art 













Partially reproduced from: Soussi et al., “Storing and transporting hazardous material, logistics 
strategies for Moroccan companies”. Advances in Science, Technology and Engineering Systems 





The number of industrial companies producing, using, storing and, or transporting 
Hazardous Materials (HM) is constantly increasing worldwide due to the growth of demand in 
various sectors (Yang et al., 2010). Because of their nature, these materials require special 
attention. Hazardous Material accidents are rare events Yet their occurrence can result in 
catastrophic industrial consequences. Here we can take the example of chemical accidents that 
are defined as the release of notable amount of toxic materials during storage, production, 
transportation, use and disposal of chemicals. Such accidents may lead to a real disaster. For 
instance poisoning which affects in a serious way all the people the properties and the 
environment (Kara, 2004; Zhang et al., 2000; Verter et al., 1996). 
In general, risk is well defined in terms of both the likelihood of the incident and the 
magnitude of the loss, injury, and damage as a measure of economic loss, human injury, or 
environmental damage (Soussi et al., 2018; CCPS, 2000). To define a risk able to manage aid 
decision makers in the transport of dangerous goods, it is useful to refer to a classification 
hierarchy of the decisional levels that may be associated with the management of that type of 
transport taking into account economic, environmental, and risk aspects (Bersani et al., 2012; 
Bersani et al., 2010). 
The risk of transporting Hazardous Materials varies depending on the type of substance. 
Transporters of hazardous goods must be aware of how these materials are classified to ensure 
compliance with marking, labeling, placarding, and shipping paper requirements (Rechkoska et 
al., 2012). Hazardous materials may be classified in any of the following: explosives, gases, 
flammable liquids, flammable solids, oxidizing substances, poisons and infectious substances, 
radioactive material, corrosives, miscellaneous goods, and other regulated materials (Rechkoska 
et al., 2012). 
Hazardous Materials transport incidents may occur at the origin or at the destination 
(loading and unloading) or on the route (Erkut, 2007). Studies have shown that the frequency of 
accidents during the transport of dangerous goods by road and rail has increased (Oggero et al., 
2006). Most of these accidents were followed by fire, explosions and gas clouds (Conca et al.,  
2016; Darbra et al., 2010). As an example, Statistically, there were 11,000 hazmat transport 





In recent decades, several historical surveys have been published on accidents in chemical 
plants and in the transportation of hazardous materials (Fabiano et al., 2012; Planas et al., 1997; 
Vilchez et al., 1995; List et al., 1991). A survey of accidents that occurred during HM's road and 
rail transport shows that accidents frequency has increased in the 20th century, most of which 
are on the road (Oggero et al. 2006). Another survey was conducted on the practices of firms 
hazmat handling facilities, this research focused on hazmat shipments and mode of 
transportation and various HM and outsourced activities (Leroux et al., 2010). In (Peignier et al., 
2011) the authors conducted a survey covering both technical elements of HM such as the class 
of these materials, geographic sites covering activities, supply and shipping, various practices 
related to HM (loading / unloading) and organizational elements for companies using hazardous 
materials (risk management, emergency preparedness, training, subcontractors). A survey of the 
accident situation of tankers carrying hazardous materials was conducted in order to identify the 
different causes and hazard classes for HM accidents, consequences and corresponding 
probabilities (Shen et al., 2014). 
The study of the literature shows that a multitude of models have developed to take into 
account different risks on different parts of the supply chain, to various activities (Ditta et al., 
2018; Verma, 2011; Raemdonck et al., 2013; Erkut et al., 2005). Thus, decisions at the 
operational level (for example, a truck driver) will not be the same as those taken at the tactical 
level (for example, the head of the part of the company), nor even as those taken at the strategic 
level (for example, the management team). Yet, each can opt for the best decisions according to 
their own point of view, their own information and their own objectives. The purpose is to assure 
a vertical cooperation in order not to have these various objectives in confrontation with one 
another on the decision-making plan. For instance, a decision taken at the operational level which 
improves the performance of the activities of the truck driver, could really have negative impacts 
on the global performance of the chain (channel). 
Nowadays in Morocco the chemical materials are used in the most productive sectors 
including industry, agriculture, health, mining and quarrying and consumption (IMIST, 2012). 
However, the chemical industry is based, essentially, on three classes of products in this case: 
petroleum products, industrial chemicals and fertilizers. 
The dangerous consequences of HM accidents have urged the Moroccan legislation to pay 
serious attention to the transportation of this type of materials. HM are defined in the Moroccan 
law N°30-05 as any material, object or organism which, by reason of its nature, may harm the 
people, the properties and the environment. No research to our knowledge in this area has been 
conducted in Morocco to assess the overall situation. 
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The purpose of this study is providing a current survey on the situation of Hazardous 
Materials in Moroccan companies in order to identify locations, types and classes of HM, 
logistics chain (supply and shipping), risk management, training of the companies with regard 
to these materials. 
Within this background, the present study aspires to (1) know the companies' methods of 
supplying and shipping HM (mode, frequency, and type of transport used) and the reasons 
behind such choices, (2) know the distribution of tasks between the shipper and the carrier during 
the loading and unloading operations of HM, (3) determine the different storage locations, (4) 
determine the HM related items representing the largest costs to companies (5) test the ability 
and willingness of companies to invest in risk reduction measures, (6) know the sector where 
subcontractors are used for operations related to HM, (7) check the companies' interest / 
involvement in the activities of their subcontractors, (8) find out the different risk reduction 
measures, (9) determine the impacts of HM accident, and finally (10) verify whether the current 
legislation  holds industrial activities related to HM or not. 
 
I. State of the art: Hazardous Materials Survey 
I.1. Survey by questionnaire 
The survey’s objective is to assess the companies' fixed sites and refer to 
logistic strategies that are adopted by them in terms of Hazardous Materials (HM). Since the 
two relevant factors (cost and risk) can affect such strategies, it is essential to understand the 
role played by these factors within these strategies. To sum up, these have been considered the 
hearth of the supply chain and have been assessed based on: (a) their procurement practices, (b) 
their expedition practices, (c) their practices on the site of their company. It is noted that the 
completion of this questionnaire was based on a study in Canada on the logistics choices of 
hazardous materials  (Nathalie et al., 2013) 
This questionnaire was sent to 103 companies that are concerned with HM from different 
sectors. In a period of 14 months we have received the responses of 55 companies (53.40%) as 






Table 20: Companies that responded to the questionnaire and their field of activity 
Companies activity Numbers 
Health and pharmaceutical 3 
Automotive industry 8 
Chemistry and oil 8 
Energy & Research 7 
other industrial activities 12 
Aviation industry 4 
building and public works & Construction 5 
Food Industry 5 
Transport and logistics 3 
Total 55 
 
The questionnaire consists of various sections; each section focuses on a particular aspect 
of the company activities. These sections are detailed as follow:  
a. Company Identification 
This domain of the survey helps gather general information about the company in order 
to obtain a quick overview (company’s name, number of employees, activity area…). And it 
also used to collect information related to the contact person and allows the transfer of results 
to the participating company. 
b. Identification of a site where there is HM 
This part of the survey asks the respondent to identify, among all the installations 
belonging to the company, a site where there are HM. All the following questions are specific 
and will be about this site. This choice was made for the sake of consistency in the responses, 
the nature and intensity of practices that can vary greatly from one site to another. Once the site 
is identified, the following information are gathered: 
• The number of employees on the site; 
• The geographical coverage of the site activities; 
• The shared part of activities related to Hazardous Materials; 
• The transport of Hazardous Materials classes found on the site; 
• The name of three main Hazardous Material found in the site. 
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c. Supply of Hazardous Materials 
This part of the questionnaire focuses on practices related to the supply of Hazardous 
Materials. Supply issues have been separated from shipping issues because these practices may 
vary depending on these two functions of the company. Some companies supply HM but they 
ship very little, usually in the form of residual hazardous materials. Questions related to supply 
issues focus on : 
• The number of Hazardous Materials received on the site; 
• The frequency of the receptions; 
• The mode of transport used for the supplies; 
• The packing used; 
• The conditions surrounding unloading; 
• The use of subcontracting. 
 
d. Shipment of Hazardous Materials 
This part of the questionnaire focuses on practices surrounding shipments of Hazardous 
Materials. It is considered as a mirror of the previous section on supplies (c), the same questions 
are asked. 
e. Hazardous Material at identified fixed site 
This part is mainly interested in the different places of storage on the identified fixed site. 
More precisely, the questions can be used to determine whether the company uses temporary 
storage sites inside or outside its site. In addition, the questions check whether companies have 
hazardous material transported frequently in order to reduce the quantities on the site. 
f. HM Supply related costs 
This part focuses on costs related to Hazardous Materials. The questions are about : 
• The criteria used by the company during these choices of supply, which makes it possible to 
weight the importance of the cost factor; 
• The importance given by the company to various factors related to Hazardous Materials 
(specialized vehicles, equipping, training, etc...); 
• The maximum percentage increase in operating costs that the company could tolerate to 
invest in security measures; 
• The weighting of the economic impact of different types of accidents on the company. 
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g. Subcontractors with activities related to Hazardous Materials 
This part of the questionnaire is interested in the use of subcontracting, a common 
measure to most companies. The objective is in particular to verify if this practice can have 
repercussions on the security level. The questions asked are relate to: 
• The sectors (transport, unloading, on-site handling, packaging, etc.)  and where the 
company uses subcontractors for its Hazardous Materials activities; 
• The reason which drives companies to use subcontractors; 
• The level of knowledge that companies have about the activities of their subcontractors; 
• The type of contracts linking companies to their subcontractors; 
• The possible loss of accountability that the business suffers when using subcontractors; 
• Measures to monitor the activities of subcontractors; 
• The important criteria when selecting a subcontractor. 
h. Risk control 
This part of the questionnaire focuses on the risk management measures put in place by the 
companies. The questions concern: 
• The risk management measures put in place on the site and during transport; 
• The risk communication policy put in place by the company; 
• Procedures surrounding accidents / incident management; 
• The possible impacts (immediate direct cost, loss of production, image loss, etc.) of a 
Hazardous Material accident on the company; 
• The relative importance of different types of accidents (fixed site vs. transportation). 
i. Regulation Hazardous Materials 
This part of the questionnaire is interested in the manner in which the companies are 
cooperating in accordance with the regulations on dangerous materials. Among other things, 
the questions check whether the different regulations (storage, transport) constrain the 
company's activities and whether, according to them, these regulations make it possible to 
manage the risk effectively. 
II. Results and Discussion 
At this juncture; we shall present the rough results and their analysis. The first part of the 
chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the results obtained from the fixed sites. The second 
part analyzes these results and the third part introduces the differences noticed between the 
small and the large companies that used hazardous materials. 
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II.1. Answers obtained 
 A total of 103 questionnaires have been supplemented to date. Four of these answers 
come from an intermediate version from the questionnaire which explains the high number of 
abstentions to the questions related to the different Residual Hazardous Materials (HMR) 
received or shipped on the site, frequency training offered, the maximum percentage increase 
in current operating costs, the economic impact on the business of an HM accident involving 
employees and  public, personnel or departments dedicated to risk management, information or 
communication on the management of risks to employees, and the organization and planning 
of on-site activities with clients, suppliers and subcontractors. 
The answers to the questions related to the Company Name and the Name of the “contact 
person” and to the first part of the identification of a site where there are Hazardous Materials 
(HM) are not presented, in order to preserve the identity of the guarantors. Moreover, the 
answers were compiled and are presented in a grouped way to obtain accurate statistics and to 
prevent the identifies of the companies from being exposed based on the answers. 
The answers obtained come from various horizons: branches of the industry, cuts of the 
company and portions of the activities related to the HMs 
II.2.  Analysis of the results 
The following parts aim at analysing the answers obtained in the survey in order to 
establish bonds between the various elements and to draw essential conclusions. In this section, 
no distinction is made between the various classes of companies. 
II.2.1. Characteristics of the responders  
In this part, we shall deal with the first two sections of our survey. Namely; the 
identification of companies and the site where Hazardous Materials are present. 
The companies which have answered the questionnaire belong to different sectors, as 
indicated in table 21 which also provides the companies sector of activities. Most of them 
belong to the groups of large companies (40% have between 250 and 5000 employees), 
averages (38.2% have between 50 and 249 employees), while a moderate percentage contains 





Table 21:Sector of Activities of the companies participating in the survey 





Health and pharmaceutical 3 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Automotive industry 8 14.5 14.5 20.0 
Chemistry and oil 8 14.5 14.5 34.5 
Energy & Research 7 12.7 12.7 47.3 
Other industrial activities 12 21.8 21.8 69.1 
Aviation industry 4 7.3 7.3 76.4 
Building and public works & 
Construction 
5 9.1 9.1 85.5 
Food Industry 5 9.1 9.1 94.5 
Transport and logistics 3 5.5 5.5 100.0 
Total 55 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 22: Number of employees in the companies participating in the survey 





Between 250 and 5000 22 40.0 40.0 40.0 
Between 10 and 49 6 10.9 10.9 50.9 
Between 50 and 249 21 38.2 38.2 89.1 
< 10 1 1.8 1.8 90.9 
> 5000 5 9.1 9.1 100.0 
Total 55 100.0 100.0  
 
More than half of the guarantors (78.2%) use more than one site to carry out their 
activities related to hazardous materials, these sites are divided into two types, factory or 
warehouse. It should be pointed out that most of the participants, (69.1%) are using the factory 
for these activities (30.9% using warehouse) (figure 6).  These sites have more than one 
geographic coverage whether it is local, regional or national as shown in table 23. 
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Table 23 Geographic coverage of supplies and shipments of the site: 
 
Figure 6: Type of installation 
When talking about Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), there is no doubt about their 
essential function in the Moroccan national economy. They represent the bulk of the 
entrepreneurial fabric, a proportion exceeding 95% and occupying more than 50% of private 
sector employees. The share of SMEs in Moroccan exports and domestic private investment is 
respectively around 31% and 51%. These entities play a vital role in promoting the social 
dimension as well as in the economic and territorial development. 
 
Geographic coverage of supplies 
and shipments of the site 






Yes 9 16.4 16.4 16.4 
No 46 83.6 83.6 100 
National 
Yes 23 41.8 41.8 41.8 
No 32 58.2 58.2 100 
Regional 
Yes 9 16.4 16.4 16.4 
No 46 83.6 83.6 100 
Another 
Yes 24 43.6 43.6 43.6 
No 31 56.4 56.4 100 
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The SME is present in all sectors of Moroccan economic activities: industry, crafts and 
construction, businesses and services that include tourism, communications, transport, financial 
services, ... .In the industrial sector in particular, the SME accounts for almost half of the total 
as follows: textiles and clothing (35%), chemistry and para-chemistry (26%), agri-food (24%), 
mechanics and metallurgy ( 12%), electrical and electronic (3%) (MAITIA, 2008). 
According to the Moroccan Ministry of Industry (Ministry of Industry,  Morocco, 2018), 
the most influential industrial sectors in the national economy are: the automotive industry for 
that Morocco is considered as the first construction hub on the African continent, followed by 
other sectors such as Aeronautics, Textile; Leather, Electronics, Electrical, Chemical-
Parachemistry, Pharmaceutical, Building Materials, Renewable Energy and Mechanical and 
Metallurgical Industries (IMM). This explains the rations and sectors related to the hazardous 
substances involved in this research. Not all the companies that answered the questionnaire are 
specialized in handling of hazardous materials. About one fourth (21.9%) of the obtained 
answers comes from companies belonging to other industries whereas the other half comes 
from related companies of different sectors. 
The figure 7 shows the percentage of companies whose part of their activities at the site 
is related to HM 
 
Figure 7: HM related activities in the site 
We have found that there are various classes of HM on the site of the median company 
where most present classes are the flammable liquids (56.4%), the gases (40%), and the 












HM related activities in the site
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Among the various dangerous substances listed on the sites, one is generally found: Gasoline, 
GPL (Butane), Sulphuric acid and Xylene. 
 
Figure 8: Classes of Hazardous Materials in the sites surveyed 
Concerning the classes of Hazardous Materials imported or exported through the port of 
Tangier Med in 2017 (TMSA, 2017), we have noted, based on some received statistics, that the 
most transported classes, as shown in Figure 9, are as follows: the flammable liquids (36%), 
corrosive matters (19%), the gases (40%). 
 
Figure 9: the classes of Hazardous Materials imported or exported through the port of Tangier 
Med in 2017 
Concerning Class 1 (Explosive) and Class 7 (Radioactive Materials), their presence 
constitutes small percentage due to the special procedures used to transport the materials of 
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these two classes, which require the approval of a special commission to be imported, exported 
or transported. In (Gouvernment of Morocco, 2011), some examples of the procedures used in 
the port national agency for these two classes depending on the Moroccan law have been cited. 
❖ Explosive material cases: 
▪ All ships carrying explosive substances must stop in the port and wear a red flag 
(bravo) during the day and a red light at night, until the berthing green light issued by the 
competent authority time and date of docking of the vessel; 
▪ The distance separating two vessels, one of which contains Class 1 goods, must be at 
least 50 meters. The distance separating two ships containing explosives must be at least 100 
meters; 
▪ The parking of class 1 goods is not allowed neither at the store nor on solid land; 
▪ The parking time of goods at the dock, while loading or unloading, must be kept to a 
minimum; 
▪ The guard (fireguard) is mandatory throughout the duration of the operations, it is the 
user’s responsibility of users. The designated custodian will be responsible for monitoring all 
fire hazards (cigarettes, spark, fire, etc.) that could occur at a distance of 30 meters from the 
vessel or cargo. It must also prohibit access on board to any foreign person; 
▪ Finally, he must warn the port authority in case of fire or explosion or risk of fire or 
explosion; 
▪ Ships carrying explosives in transit may be permitted to handle other non-dangerous 
goods at a berth station assigned to general traffic. 
 
❖ Radioactive material cases: 
▪ Any vessel handling a radioactive source at the port, no matter how small, must request 
it at least a week in advance from the port authority; 
▪ Vehicles will be allowed to enter the port only if the packages are accompanied by a 
certificate from the exporting country indicating the nature of the radioactive source and its 
activity, stating that the packing and stowage comply with the regulatory requirements of the 
OMI; 
▪ The vessel may perform its loading or unloading operations at a berth destined for the 
traffic of general cargo provided, however, the distance separating the radioactive source from 
other vessels must be at least 60 meters; 
▪ The goods must only dock at the time strictly necessary for loading or unloading; 
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▪ Before entering the port, a radioactive material specialist at the public health radio 
station at the user's expense must board the equipment equipped with measuring devices to 
ensure that the radioactivity of the packages does not show any signs of radioactivity. danger 
for handling. He will also have to carry out a systematic control of this radioactivity throughout 
the duration of the operations; 
▪ A guard at the expense of the users have to prohibit to any person foreign to the port, 
access to a distance of 60 meters of the zone where the packages are. 
II.2.2. Provisioning and forwarding   
The great majority of the guarantors (70.9%) affirm receiving HM  or products controlled 
on the identified fixed site. and just 27% of the companies that make the shipment of HM or 
products controlled from their site as shown in the following graphic: 
 
Figure 10: the supply and shipping of Hazardous Materials of the companies surveyed on 
their sites 
This is explained by the presence of companies consumers and non-producers of HM 
within the sample. The majority (27.3%) of the companies affirm the treatment of five different 
dangerous substances or more (figure 11). The very great majority of the companies (79.8%) 
receives dangerous substances during the month, the week or few times a year. 
In contrast, we found the majority (10.9%) of 25.5% of companies affirming the shipment 
of hazardous materials from their sites, averred that they treat five different dangerous 
substances or more. The very great majority of the companies (28.6%) ship dangerous 
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substances during the day, 23.8% during the month or a few times a month, 19% during the 
week (figure 12). 
 
Figure 11: Number of Hazardous Materials received/ shipped from the sites. 
 
Figure 12:Frequency of receiving/shipping HM to or through the sites. 
The means of transport preferred for the provisioning are, respectively (figure 13): the 
truck (74.5%), the train (5.5%), the boat (27.3%), pipeline (3.6%) and the plane (1.8%). The 
strong preponderance of the truck can surprise at first sight, but recall that according to the 
questionnaire, a company would notch this choice recourse to a means of transport, even if it is 
in an occasional way. The percentages collected cannot thus be translated into mileage, tonnage 
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or a number of sending. We have also found that the most common mode of transportation is 
the conditioned mode (67.3%), which bulk transport just 18.2% of respondents who affirmed 
who are using its use. 
 
Figure 13:mode of transportation used to transport HM 
A high number of companies affirm that it would be impossible to change means of 
transport. The majority of the other companies affirm that they could change means of transport 
only for some substances but not for all the substances. It should be recalled here that the choice 
of a means of transport is largely influenced by the proximity of the infrastructures of transport. 
Very few companies (12.7%) carry out truck transport on their own. This task is usually 
assigned to the supplier (41.8%) or to a third-party carrier (23.6%) (Figure 14). However, the 
majority of the companies supervise the unloading of the dangerous substances (41.8%) and in 
many cases carry out unloading (21.8%). There are on the other hand some companies that uses 






Figure 14: responsible for truck transport 
 
Figure 15: Supervising the unloading of HM or HMR in supply 
II.2.3. Hazardous Materials (HM) at fixed site 
The training offered to the employees working with the quays of shipping/receiving is 
often offered by a consultant (39.2%), yet the majority (56.4%) of the employers are concerned 
too, as shown in figure 16. This training is often offered during the recruitment (47.3%) or even 
annually (47.3%). Among the surveyed companies only (3.6%) announce that they offer this 
training in three years (figure 17). The other companies include it with other trainings sessions 





Figure 16: The training offered to the employees of the shipping/receiving. 
 
Figure 17: The frequency of training offered to the employees at site. 
The majority of the companies (54.5%) always or often use zones dedicated to HM. Some 
companies however affirm that they’re used only sometimes (10.9%) or even rarely (10.9%). 
In the opposite way, it is not frequent that dangerous substances are stored in a temporary way 
on the site of the company. A few companies (21.8%) have even stated that they often if not 
always have recourse to this practice. 
On the other hand, temporary storage outside the site is not very widespread. Only 
16.3% (3.6% always, 12.7% sometimes) of the companies use temporary storage on a site 
which does not belong to their own company, whereas temporary storage on other sites 
belonging to the company touches 18.2% of the guarantors (5.5% always, 12.7% often). 
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The majority of the companies affirm that they transport HM more often in order to avoid 
having too much of it on the site. A considerable share of the companies (65.5%) affirm that 
they have recourse to this practice always (12.7%), very often or sometimes (52.8%), whereas 
21.8% of the companies say that they never do it, as shown in figure 18 below. This contributes 
to the increase in the number of convoys on the roads, although the quantities remain the same. 
 
Figure 18 :Statements that are part of the company's practice for HM. 
 
II.2.4. Costs related to HM supplies and shipments 
The majority of the companies (85.5%) are ready to invest more in safety since the sums 
do not exceed a certain level. In the vast majority of cases, this level is below 5% (for 20% of 
them) or even 10% (for 14.6% of companies that have answered) on current operating costs 





Figure 19: percentage of operating costs that companies would to invest for security 
measures. 
Moreover, when they make their choices of provisioning or HM forwarding, the criterion 
“Transport security” is mentioned very often (89.1%) followed by the “cost of transport” 
(83.6%) then the “cost of storage” (70.9%) as shown in figure 20. Several companies did not 
classify their answers in order of importance, but even with fragmentary results, this 
classification offers a distribution similar to the one mentioned so far. 
 





The most frequently mentioned Hazardous Materials items when referring to costs as 
shown in figure 21 are, in order:  equipment on the site and employee training (74.6%), security 
audits (69.1%), specialized vehicles (67.4%), regulatory measures (65.5%), General insurance 
premiums (56.4¨%) and hiring of a security manager (52.7%). The insurance premiums (52.7%) 
and the accidents/incidents HM (49.1%), are less often mentioned. 
 
Figure 21: The costs incurred by HM represent a significant burden for the company. 
The guarantors had to consider the economic impact of three types of accidents (with 
spill, implying employees, implying the public) compared to the economic impact of an 
accident isolated without discharge. In the three cases, the companies have estimated that the 
impact would be more important, and their evaluation of the possible impacts on their company 
increases with each new scenario. Indeed, 16.4% of the guarantors have estimated that the 
impact would be much more important for an accident with spill whereas this 
proportion grows to 32.7% for an accident involving employees and to 36.4% for an accident 
involving the public. We have noticed, however that some guarantors have estimated that the 








Figure 22 : the economic impact of an MD accident on the company. 
II.2.5. Subcontractors with activities related to HM  
All companies use subcontractors for any of their Hazardous Materials activities. The 
areas where they are most popular as shown in figure 23 are, in order: transportation (45.5% 
supply and 34.5% shipping), loading (40.5%) and unloading (34.5%). On the other hand, a few 
companies use the services of subcontractors on their site, whether while handling (27.3%), 
packaging (25.6%), storing (18.2%) or producing (18.2%). 
 
Figure 23: subcontractors in HM activities 
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Regarding the use of subcontractors for transport, companies mainly cite: the fact that 
they do not have the expertise (23.6%) and the fact that the carrier shares the responsibility of 
the risk (25.5%), the costs (16.4%) and the fact that they do not have vehicles (9.1%) as 
illustrated in figure 24 below. Conversely, the most cited reasons for not using subcontractors 
are risk management (32.7%) and costs (14.5%) or other reasons (23.6%). 
 
Figure 24: reasons for using the subcontractors in the transport activities. 
A number of elements point to a tendency towards disempowerment. For example, 
several respondents have claimed that the impact of a transport accident made by their 
subcontractor would have a zero impact on their company (20%) or lower (25.5%) than an 
accident, with their own vehicles. Besides, 25.5% have said that they never perform safety 
audits of their subcontractors while only 20% have stated that they always do. When we 
combine these few elements with the fact that 16.4% of the companies know perfectly well that 
their subcontractors delegate in their turn to subcontractors (29.1% ignore it and 5.5% are 
vaguely aware of it), one can easily realize the extent of the phenomenon of disempowerment 
in transport. 
Regarding the contracts of these companies with their subcontractors, 10.9% of 
respondents still use long-term contracts with their subcontractors while 21.8% have 
mentioned that they never use them (Figure 25). When it comes to the selection of the 
subcontractors targeted by these contracts, companies are mainly concerned with: reliability / 
quality of service (72.7%), control of safety (70.9%), cost (69.1%), ISO certifications (60%), 
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the ability to track transportation (52.7%), carrier reputation (50.9%) and past accidents 
(50.9%). The possibility of establishing a lasting relationship (45.5%) receives less attention, 
although they are also considered important by many companies (figure 26). 
 
Figure 25: Long term contracts between the company and their subcontractors. 
 
Figure 26: The relevant criteria while selecting a carrier for HM 
II.2.6.  Risk management 
Almost all companies report performing risk analyses on their site, in spite of numbers 
such as never (7.3%) rarely (7.3%) or sometimes (16.4%). On the other hand, they are less 
likely to do risk analyses for transportation; a number of companies never do (16.4%), rarely 
(10.9%) or sometimes (21.8%) and only 21.8% always do, unlike 34.5% in fixed site. This is 
because a large number of companies outsource transportation activities. Similarly, companies 
are more likely to have stricter procedures than the law on their site for transport (23.6% still 
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use more stringent procedures than the law on the site, against 16.4% for 
transport). Additionally, few companies (18.2%) use tracking technologies (GPS, etc.) to 
transport HMs (40% never use them) (figure 27). 
 
Figure 27: Risk management for the surveyed companies 
A few companies communicate their risks with citizens, whether for their site (12.7% 
always do it) or for transport (7.3% always do), but many companies use their risk management 
to enhance their image with 29.1% of respondents who have said that they never do it, as shown 
in figure below. 
 
Figure 28: Risk communication in the surveyed companies. 
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The majority of respondents (52.7%) still claim that they use specific 
procedures while loading and unloading HMs. Though, some companies never use them 
(16.4%), rarely (3.6%) or sometimes (16.4%). On the side of the various risk management 
programs, we have observed the same situation. Most companies offer risk management 
information/communication sessions to their employees (69.1%), have a workplace health and 
safety committee (69.1%), and have dedicated risk management staff (61.8%). %), or a 
prevention program specific to MD (61.8%) (figure 29). 
 
Figure 29: Risk management programs in the surveyed companies. 
 
When the companies are questioned about the possible impacts of an HMs accident (in 
transport or on the site) on their company, the companies answer respectively, as shown in 
figure 30: the direct cost (70.9%), the loss of image (65.5%), the loss of production (65.5%), 






Figure 30: The possible impacts on the company in case of HMs accident 
Most companies (56.4%) still list these accidents in a register, although 7.3% of 
respondents say they never do so and 3.6% rarely do. In the same way, 60% of the companies 
always carry out investigations following these accidents whereas 3.6% of the companies affirm 
that they never do it. (figure 31). 
 
Figure 31: Accident/incident management for the surveyed companies. 
In the opinion of many companies, a fixed-site accident (49.1%) would have a greater 




Figure 32: Type of HM accidents and their weight on the companies. 
II.2.7. HM Regulation (Law No. 30-05 on the transport of dangerous goods by 
road) 
Many companies claim that MD regulations (site, transportation, health and safety) 
restrict their day-to-day activities with only 23.6% of companies saying they never limit them. 
Storage regulations seem to be the one that restricts businesses the most. On the other hand, 
30.9% of companies say that Health and Safety at Work regulations never limit them and 29.1% 
of companies say that transport regulations never limit them (figure 33). It should be 
remembered, however, that the majority of companies do not perform the transportation 
themselves, which may influence their perception of transportation regulations. 
 




Due to the limitations imposed by the storage regulations, several companies had to: make 
substitutions of materials (54.6%), reduce their stocks of HMs (61.9%) or change their logistical 
choices and delivery frequencies (52.7%). 
 
Figure 34: the choice of modifications that can be made by companies according to HM 
storage regulations. 
Our primary objective is based on the development of this part of the study by examining 
the nature, quantity and routes of HM in circulation in Morocco. Unfortunately, while we were 
doing this research, there was a lack of information and statistics on HMs even among the 
services and state agencies. As a result, it was difficult to formulate a coherent and precise idea 
on this question at the national level. That can be attributed to several reasons, the most 
important of which is the absence of an exhaustive official inventory of HM currently 
circulating in Morocco, only a few fragmentary statistics are available. They are carried out in 
the places of production and consumption without indicating the precise nature of the 
substances transported. 
The classification adopted by Morocco is that developed by the UN. When examining the 
data from our survey, we can conclude that the classes of the most dangerous substances 
transported in Morocco are flammable liquids, gases and corrosive substances (figure 8), so the 
transport administration must be aware the danger of major accidents that may occur by: 
▪ fires and / or explosions caused by flammable materials; 
▪ serious disorders related to inhalation or ingestion of certain toxic substances Etc. 
The industrial sector ranks second in the Moroccan economy (HCP, 2018), so the range 
of dangerous products, which are mainly manufactured products in circulation, is not very wide. 
The hydrocarbon sector and its derivatives are the ones that accounts for the majority of safety 
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concerns related to hazardous substances transported. This sector is important on the national 
scale, with two respects: 
▪ the preponderant and vital role of hydrocarbons in the country's economy; 
▪ the largest volume of hazardous substances carried is that of hydrocarbons and their 
derivatives. 
The hazardous substances produced (re-imported) and transported locally come from 
several industrial branches of which we quote the most important: 
◼ the Petroleum sector: this sector is almost exclusively confused with the oil 
terminals of the Tangier Med port, Jorf Lasfar port and Mohammedia port..., which store and 
distribute substances considered to be among the most dangerous. They are all the more so 
since their circulation is daily, massive and embracing the whole national territory with a higher 
concentration in urban agglomerations. 
The most frequently transported materials in this sector are liquid fuels, gases, LPG, etc.; 
◼ the industrial gases sector: are various chemical materials and often dangerous. It 
contains liquid air and its main components (nitrogen, oxygen, argon, etc.) but also nitrogen 
proxy and medical gases; 
◼ the sector of inorganic chemicals such as acids and various inorganic compounds 
whose degree of dangerousness is high; 
◼ the organic chemicals sector including all petrochemicals and carbochemicals such 
as organic alcohols and acids, cyclic hydrocarbons, etc.; 
◼ The Industrial Chemicals sector, which supplies the market with special lubricants, 
activated mineral materials and various preparations for welding, knock-downs, etc .; 
◼ the agrochemical sector: which is illustrated by the manufacture of insecticides, 
pesticides, herbicides and all the well-known phytosanitary products; 
◼ the nitrogen products sector: also known for their dangerous nature because of the 
materials they contain, such as ammonia, nitric acid, nitrates,  
◼ calcium cyanamide, etc. It is also this sector that manufactures nitrogen or phosphate 
fertilizers; 
◼ the explosives sector: probably the most dangerous hazardous material in the event 
of an accident during its transport, or simply of its handling. For example, propellants, 




◼ the paints and varnishes sector: This is an industrial sector that uses and produces 
dangerous substances such as solvents, paint removers, varnishes and, of course, paints 
intended for all uses; 
◼ the plastics sector: it is by far the most developed in Morocco. He is one of the major 
consumers of dangerous substances. We can mention the different polymers, resins, polyesters, 
silicones, etc. 
Other very high-risk branches should also have been mentioned if they existed in 
Morocco. This is the case for nuclear materials such as uranium, thorium and other highly 
dangerous compounds and radioelements in the event of an accident. 
Hazardous substances imported or produced and distributed in Morocco mainly use the 
road to reach their destination (Figure 13), the mode which represents more than 75% of the 
national freight (Ministry of Economy, 2013). 
The analysis of accidents caused by hazardous materials, as indicated in (Vilchez et al., 
1995) have shown that these accidents are significantly highly occurring during the transport 
of theses HM, followed by accidents occurred in processing plants and storage facilities. In 
contrast, most domino accidents are found in storage area, followed by process plants and 
transportation (Darbra et al., 2010), which are mainly caused by LPG,  petrol and gasoline 
(Darbra et al., 2010). 
Road transport of hazardous substances has the advantage and the convenience of 
directly linking the producer and the consumer. In this case, the quantities transported packaged 
or in bulk, are relatively less important (a few tons to a few tens of tons). This also allows, at 
least in theory, to reduce the risk of accidents by minimizing the handling and unloading-
loading operations. Moreover, users of dangerous substances can be scattered throughout the 
national territory. In fact, the majority of companies that produce or use as raw material the 
dangerous substances are concentrated in Casablanca and its surroundings and also the region 
of Tangier. Nevertheless, this is not a safety advantage as accidents in urban and suburban areas 
can be particularly disastrous.  
The fact that Morocco has a fairly large network of national roads and interurban 
highways is an asset for the road transport of dangerous substances. Most of the accidents in 
which they are involved are generally due to vehicle failures and especially to the imprudence 
of the transport professionals. 
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Among the dangerous products transported are flammable liquids, gases and corrosive 
substances, which is represented in  (Shen et al., 2014) as the most frequent hazmat tanker 
accidents. The rarest materials are radioactive materials (Figure 8). 
Even if the increase in the number of tankers used to transport oil and other dangerous 
substances is justified by the ever-increasing demand for these products, which are essential for 
economic activity, the fact remains that this activity generates a multitude of potential dangers 
(fires, explosions, intoxications, negative impacts on the environment). 
The constraints of competitiveness and productivity imposed on industrial, mining and 
agricultural stakeholders, mean that the transportation of these products to the exploitation sites 
is carried out at a frantic pace and generally without much precaution. Moreover, the 
multiplicity of the risks of pollution and the various other dangers that this field of transport 
provokes is often unpredictable, to the point that in the event of an accident, these risks took 
the appearance of a catastrophe not only for the environment but also for users (the populations).  
For example, the accidental spillage of flammable, explosive or highly toxic products is 
always the most dangerous because the damage caused would be disastrous. 
Unlike the road network which covers the entire national territory, the rail network for 
the transport of HM is limited to Atlantic Morocco with two axes serving the Northeast (Oujda) 
and Central West (Casablanca) respectively. A good part of this network is reserved for the 
transport of phosphates. 
With the recent development of passenger transport, the Moroccan railway does not offer 
a large place for goods in general, and even less for dangerous goods. The ones it is accustomed 
to and continues to transport are always connected to phosphate (phosphoric acid, sulfuric acid, 
fertilizer). Explosives are also among the dangerous substances carried by the railways. The 
administration of ONCF applies strict regulations on them, and no major accident has ever 
occurred. 
The transport of dangerous goods by rail was regulated by the Dahir n° 1-01-223 of 30 
August 2001, confirming the ratification by Morocco of the Convention concerning 
International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) and its appendix on the transport of dangerous goods 
better known. also, under the initials RID (Moroccan government, 2002). 
In terms of risk management, the results show that 47.3% of companies received 
hazardous materials training for the entire supply chain during recruitment and thereafter on a 
yearly basis (Figure 16). So, the majority of companies expressed their willingness to supply 
security equipment and almost all companies have shown that the choice of HM supply or 
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shipments is based primarily on the criteria of transport security (89.1%) and transport cost 
(83.6%) as shown in Figure 20. 
The data analysis also highlighted some specific characteristics. Most accidents are due 
to operations such as the loading / unloading of HM as indicated in (Darbra et al., 2010), these 
operations as shown in our research (Figure 23) are dedicated mainly to the subcontractor, it 
seems that an additional effort should be devoted to improve the security of these procedures, 
including stricter legislation and better training. 
 
It is remind that the decree of application of the law 30-05 relating to the road transport 
of the dangerous goods was published in the Official Bulletin on June 30, 2011 (Gouvernment 
of Morocco, 2011).The law fixes the conditions of security imposed on the carriers and 
envisages sanctions and sentences d imprisonment ranging from one month to two years and 
fines of DH 2,000 to DH 100,000. In order to align with European standards for road transport 
of dangerous goods, in particular the European Agreement on International Transport 
dangerous goods by road, known as ADR. Law 30-05 determines all the conditions applicable 
to this type of transport: from loading to unloading, from the conditions of use of the vehicles 
to the obligations incumbent on the operators in the operation. 
Though Morocco is among the first signatory countries to these agreements, the 
application of these agreements is not yet widespread because of lack of implementing 
legislation. As a result, with the exception of oil companies and multinationals, most tanker 
drivers do not distinguish between a potato load and radioactive or explosive material. Several 
Moroccan companies organize ADR training for the benefit of their drivers and can travel in 
Europe without any problem to transport dangerous goods on European soil. There is no point 
in passing a law if it is not applied in the field. What we are seeing now is that some customers 
are not demanding and always favor the cost factor at the expense of security. 
Several accidents caused by tanker trucks had serious economic, social and environmental 
consequences. Since 2007, the Bouregreg Watershed Agency has sued two carriers for 
accidentally spilling part of their oil load. The first directly in the wadi Bencheqcheq and the 
second, near the wadi Amiran in the region of Bouznika. "The cleaning operations cost 220,000 
dirhams and we ask the authors of the pollution damages"(EL ARIF, 2014). 
Nowadays, there is a real gap between multinationals whose number remains limited and 
local businesses which are likely to be more numerous. Multinationals with significant 
resources are more compliant with safety standards for the transport of dangerous products and 
substances. Local operators, on the other hand, are relatively less sensitive to the importance of 
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these standards. But, we still lack application texts. In the absence of these texts, professionals 
do not apply fortiori the regulatory provisions. By contrast, multinationals apply the standards 
of their parent companies while local companies do not apply the regulations. The change in 
this situation that threatens to give rise to a disaster at any time in the event of an accident 

























This study presents the results of a survey on logistic choices related to hazardous 
materials in Morocco. it focused on the determination of the nature of these hazardous materials, 
in terms of classes of materials transported, frequency of supply and shipment, etc, and then 
identified the most used organizational security practices by Moroccan companies. 
This study undertakes to determine the situation of hazardous materials in Morocco, we 
tried to give an analytical and holistic analysis for the whole transport logistic chain of these 
HMs. 
Organizational and technical security measures need to improve through the introduction 
of a culture of safety throughout the HM chain of shippers, handlers, carriers and consignees of 
HMs, who must therefore receive training adapted to their field of activity and their level of 
responsibility especially for classes (classes 3, 2 and 8) as well as the high presence in the 
Moroccan industry sector and which have the highest risk in case of accident. 
The results obtained in this research can help the interests involved (authorities, 
professionals and companies) for strategic and operational planning of the transport chain of 
dangerous products in Morocco. 
The exploratory research we have conducted can pave the way for a wide variety of 
development perspectives. It might be interesting to extend this survey to the kingdom as a 
whole in order to highlight possible discrepancies in the use of organizational security practices. 
Among other things, the possibility of developing a guide to good practices for carriers 
to inform them of the practices they can put in place to reduce their risk, or the possibility of 
making many recommendations to different ministries in relation to the training, the use of 
equipment, accident register policies, or even mount communication campaigns to raise 
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Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a methodology which estimates the risk proposing 
a quantitative evaluation by joining incident consequences and frequencies estimation (Hassan 
et al., 2009). Risk is well defined as “a measure of economic loss, human injury, or 
environmental damage in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss, 
injury, and damage” (CCPS, 2000). Quantification of the risk by the combination of accident 
probability estimation and consequences models for accidental events which involve hazardous 
material (hazmat) products represents the main important issues in the risk-averse routing 
problem for hazmat vehicles (Bersani et al., 2010). In a general, the transportation risk analysis 
(TRA) has been presented by a three-dimension approach as proposed in (AIChE/CCPS, 1995). 
TRA integrates the goals, the complexity of the study and the level of detail of the analysis. The 
user can perform a limited, generalized or detailed set of risk estimation and, contemporary, he 
can carry out a qualitative, semi quantitative, or quantitative risk analysis. 
In other words, QRA represents the main detailed analysis based on consequence, 
frequency, and risk estimation in the framework of TRA. 
The practical application of those well-known procedures to compute risk evaluation, due 
to interrelationship among different subsystems involved in hazmat transportation problem, 
gives rise to difficulties. For a System of System (SoS) perspective, different components 
characterize this problem: vehicle, driver, transported hazardous material, infrastructure, 
external conditions, and exposures can affect risk analysis evaluation. Besides also different 
players such as manufacturers, carriers, logistics operators, public authorities and emergency 
responders have different roles in the hazmat risk management. Often the interaction among 
such SoS components increases complexity in the hazmat risk assessment. 
From a technological viewpoint, the prevention of the risk in automotive systems is 
realized by passive and active safety technology. The first technology refers to the interactions 
among components of the vehicle to protect occupants during a crash. Besides, active safety 
technology mainly refers to system which assists in the prevention of a crash (e.g. Antilock 
Braking System - ABS). Some more recent devices shift the attention towards physiological 
alterations of drivers. In this respect, human behavior observation during a transport process is 
another important component closely related to safety. 
Tracking/tracing vehicles technology has already become a prerequisite for the vehicle 
safety with important application to hazmat transport. 
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From an analysis viewpoint, the different subjects involved in the hazmat transport 
require a methodology which simply, but qualitatively and quantitatively, shows how the 
interaction among these systems and the variation of some parameters may lead to an accident. 
Moreover, end users would like also to know how it is possible to detect and forecast these 
accidents, and how it is possible to modify the route to minimize the maximum exposure of 
population to the accident risk, which is in turn function of the interaction of the different 
systems. A wide range of literature is available from academic and industrial sources to realize 
a QRA in hazmat transportation framework taking into account the different components of the 
risk computation. 
The main purpose of this paper is to present a QRA dedicated to hazmat road transport 
based on simplified approach for the frequency and consequences analysis. Usually, a QRA 
needs to carry out the frequency and consequence analyses which represent two critical steps 
in the risk evaluation. Those analyses should identify all relevant hazards covering the complete 
range of potential incident taking into account the conditional probability of the consequences 
arising given the occurrence of a hazmat accident. The proposed simplified approach provides 
the hazmat transport operators and public authorities with relevant data about risk estimation 
with a limited effort in the collection and computation of data. The frequency analysis will be 
realized by considering preselected event tree schemes for hazmat product. The consequences 
analysis will be based on an expeditious method (APAT, 2006)  to compute the hazard distance 
to identify the impact area for different accident scenarios. 
I. CCPS guideline for QRA approach 
A full-scale QRA application should require the following sequence of sub-steps (CCPS, 2008). 
1. Determination and classification of possible scenarios: this step consists of identifying 
each hazardous material movement, the method of transport chosen, also the route and route 
segments covered during the transport; 
2. Data collection for frequency analysis: reliable data about accident and non-accident 
rates, failures equipment, spill or release probabilities, container designs, other factors 
influencing probabilities of hazardous outcome have to be collected. Reviews of public and 
private studies, review of literature in scientific context, stakeholders and carriers’ comments 
and other sources have to be consulted; 
3. Selection of consequences measure: this step provides estimation of the consequences 
that accident scenario could give rise. It includes also identifying the impact area pertinent for 
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every possible incident scenario. Type, dimension, and orientation of the release, weather 
conditions, wind speed, atmospheric stability are the main factors that determinate the size of 
the impact zone; 
4. QRA application. The fourth step implies to perform the generation of the QRA, 
defining frequency and consequence analysis according to previous step results. 
5. Presentation of results. This fifth step provides the presentation of QRA conclusions using 
standard risk criteria comparison or other benchmarking values to estimate the results. 
I.1. Frequency analysis 
Frequency analysis implies the computation of two main components: the probability that 
the undesirable Initiating Event (IE) may occur and the Probability of Hazmat Outcome (PHO) 
after the IE. The hazard outcome case represents the physical manifestation of the incident 
scenario i.e. jet-fire, pool fire, or toxic cloud in case of toxic product transportation. The 
frequency analysis for IE includes the computation of the estimated accident rate (per year) for 
the specific logistic operation. The task to compute the accident rate requires a large amount of 
accident data. When accident data for each selected road section is not available, in order to 
obtain statistically significant information on frequencies, usually statistical data coming from 
international or national accident database are used. On the other hand, the computation of the 
PHO case happened after an accident, needs to identify a number of possible accident scenarios 
for each hazmat. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (Ericson, 2005) is usually used to model PHO 
according to the frequency of occurrence of different releases. ETA is an analysis technique for 
identifying and evaluating the sequence of events in a potential accident following the 
occurrence of an IE. ETA utilizes a graphical logic tree structure known as an event tree (ET). 
The objective of ETA is to determine when the IE will generate a serious accident or if the IE 
is controlled by the safety systems or procedures (Clifton, 2005). To complete an ET, the initial 
release frequency has to be inserted on the initiating branch. In most ETs, the IE produces 
different pivotal events that usually are modeled as binary. The possible scenarios ensuing from 
the IE coming from the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the pivotal events. It needs to build the 
event tree diagram in order to gain event failure probabilities. The PHO for different outcomes 
is associated with each branch of the ET. Consequently, the risk is computed multiplying the 
values on each branch of the tree until the root. The probabilities indicated in an ET are 
dependent on the physical and chemical characteristic of the hazmat spilled product 
(temperature, pressure or flammability), on the released types, on the amount of the leakage, 
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and the external environment condition. Crash or release from a valve, the structures of the 
equipment (width, material, shape) produce different accident outcome case. 
I.2. Consequences analysis 
In the terminology of QRA, “consequence” is a measure of the expected damages of the 
incident scenarios which effects the “impact area”. This latter is the area over which a particular 
incident outcome case produces lethal effects, based on specified thresholds, on health (e.g. 
death, injury, and exposure), property loss, and environment. In this study, only health effect 
has been considered. The impact area, in detail, indicates the geographical area in which an 
atmospheric release of a substance would affect the present exposure in a specified time horizon 
(ERG, 2016). Besides, impact area can be defined also as an estimated area where a hazard 
(such as toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation, or damaging overpressure) has exceeded a 
user-specified Level of Concern (LOC). The Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold value of a 
hazard (toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation, or overpressure) above which a threat to 
people or property or environment may exist (EPA, 1987). The PHMSA's Emergency Response 
Guidebook (ERG, 2016) by U.S. Department of Transportation provides initial isolation 
distance in case of an accident involving specific hazardous materials and, often, first 
responders and hazmat decision planners use it. 
Another popular model used to calculate the chemical concentration after a release is the 
Gaussian Plume Model (GPM) (Verma, 2007). Depending on the properties of hazmat, Heavy 
Gas Model (HGM) is used as applicable instead of GPM (Serrano,  2014). 
Other atmospheric dispersion tools based on a geographic information system (GIS) 
exists to generate the impact area. Area Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (EPA, 2013), for 
example, is the hazard modeling program based on the CAMEO® software suite (Aloha, EPA), 
which is used widely to plan and respond to chemical emergencies. It generates impact zone 
estimates for various types of incident outcome: toxic gas clouds, flammable gas clouds, 
BLEVEs (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions), jet fires, pool fires, and vapor cloud 
explosions. The computation is based on the characteristics of the released product, release 
behavior, weather conditions, and tank car design information. Finally, the quantification of 
population exposed, in terms of number of person potentially exposed in case of accident in the 
impact area, is a fundamental step for the risk assessment. This computation can be realized by 
elaborating statistical population data available in the latest census published by national 
authorities or it could be determined through a more detailed GIS analysis. Other sophisticated 
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techniques can be applied based on dynamics of the population in space and time as dasymetric 
mapping method (Mennis, 2003) or by population distribution data coming from mobile phone 
user detection (Bersani et al., 2016). 
I.3. QRA application 
Risk measures that can be computed by the QRA are basically two: individual risk and 
societal risk. Individual risk is defined as the probability that an average unprotected person, 
permanently present at a certain location, is affected due to an accident resulting from a 
hazardous activity. Societal risk represents the cumulative frequency per year that a group of 
people could be killed by an accidental event in the impact area. It is usually represented by a 
F-N curve. This curve plots, as a log/log graph, the expected annual frequency (F) of the number 
(N) of fatalities in the impact area arising from all possible hazmat incidents. In order to evaluate 
the acceptability of risk associated to a selected logistic operation, ALARP criteria could be 
used. ALARP criteria, which means “As Low As Reasonable Practicable”, proposed in (DNV, 
2014), represent a standard methodology to evaluate risk. 
II. Proposed QRA method 
In the presented paper, the QRA for hazmat transportation by road is based on an 
approximation of the CCPS guidelines. The author realized a simplified approach in order to 
allow a less complex risk analysis useful to carry out a basic evaluation of the risk level for a 
selected hazmat transport activity. 
II.1. Frequency analysis in the proposed approach 
In the proposed approach, the accident frequency comes from statistical data of accidents 
aggregated for road network classification, i.e. accident on highway or on route outside or 
within urban area. Besides, the PHO is generated by multiplying three components: 
PHO = CRP x SSD x PWS 
 
where 
▪ CRP, the conditional release probability, is the probability of a release given an accident; 
▪ SSD, the spill size probability, is the probability of different release sizes and; 
▪ PWS, the probability for weather stability, represents probability of different 
stability/wind speed combinations. 
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In the proposed model, a limited number of scenarios are preliminarily defined taking 
into account a limited number of values for the component in (1). Only one CRP value, three 
different possible spill size probabilities (small, medium and large) for SSD and PSW values 
for two typical stability classes of meteorological conditions are taken into account for the 
frequency analysis. 
II.2. Consequence analysis in the proposed approach 
The identification of the impact area, relevant to each possible outcome case, represents 
one of the main tasks in the consequences analysis. Many models and tools exist, as presented 
in the previous section, to estimate the impact area for hazmat accident outcome. 
In the proposed approach, the “expeditious” Shortcut Method (APAT, 2006) has been 
used to compute the impact area using a low number of attributes and parameters (Baldacci, 
2004). The method provides, by a simple tabular application, the largest horizontal extent 
(radius) of the impact area from the point in which the accident takes place. The Shortcut 
Method aims at estimating the consequences of incidental events related to the storage, handling 
and transport of hazmat by rail, road and pipeline. The application of the Shortcut Method for 
hazmat transport by road provides the estimate of the maximum hazard distances of impact for 
two types of incident events: incident with high probability of occurrence, characterized by 
limited magnitude, but still relevant; incident with medium probability, associated with more 
remote occurrence and medium-gravity magnitude, typical of relevant events but still credible. 
Shortcut method provides the hazard radius according to the four standard thresholds of 
lethality (high lethal, lethal, irreversible lesions, reversible lesions) and for two average weather 
conditions (D.5 and F.2 based on Pasquill's six stability classes (PASQUILL, 1961)). This 
speditive method represents a good alternative to more complex software simulation tool 
because it guaranties good accuracy requesting a limited number of input data. 
In the proposed approach, the impact area has been constructed as a buffer of uniform 
radius centred in the location of the hazard source. Besides, considering the hazmat shipment 
over a route as the movement of this danger circle, a band on both sides of the route has been 
designated. This region outlines the impact area (Bersani et al., 2016). In the proposed 
approach, the route has to be divided into sections, identifying the type of network and the level 
of urbanization in the covered area. The selected area has been classified according to average 
population density values for only three types of locations (rural, suburban or urban area).  
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Finally, the number of inhabitants potentially exposed is computed by multiplying 
population density value per area of impact. 
III. Case study: application of the proposed methodology on 
TANGIER-TETOUAN region (MOROCCO) 
The proposed case study consists of defining the societal risk for the hazmat transport by 
road in the Tangier-Tétouan region, in Morocco. This specific location has a growing freight 
traffic due to the importance of the Med Tangier Port (MTP) in the context of the Mediterranean 
Sea, with special interest to hazmat transport. Port Tangier Med represents a global logistics 
hub, located on the Strait of Gibraltar, and connected to 174 global ports. It might provide a 
yearly capacity of 9 million containers, 7 million passengers, 700.000 trucks and 1 million 
vehicles. 
Tangier Med is an industrial platform for more than 800 companies representing an 
annual turnover of € 6,400 million in various sectors such as automotive, aeronautics, logistics, 
textiles and trade (TMSA, 2018).  
In details, two different paths to transport gasoline by trucks between Med Tangier Port 
(MTP) and Tangier (TA) are considered and compared in terms of risk. The Kingdom of 
Morocco is a country located north-west Africa. It is bordered by Atlantic Ocean at west, by 
Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea at north. Tangier Tétouan region, located in the 
northern Morocco, is characterized by a sub-humid Mediterranean climate due to the presence 
of Atlantic and Mediterranean winds. There are two types of predominant winds: the western 
Atlantic wind, which is prevailing blows in November and March from the North-West to the 
South-West; the Mediterranean east winds that often blow in warm seasons from the East to the 
North-east. Wind speed reaches an average between 2 and 6 m\s. Otherwise, in 30% of the 
cases, the wind blows between 7 and 14 m\s. Finally, in the rest 20% of the cases, it is less than 
2m\s. However, the above 15m\s wind speed is exceptional (1%) (TMSA, 2018). The proposed 
case study concerns the gasoline, GPL and, Chlorine transport between Med Tangier port and 
Tangier, and between Med Tangier port and Tétouan by road.  
Statistically, more than 1 Million of tonnes of hydrocarbon has been transferred covering 
this area by truck. The 7% of the hydrocarbon transported on roads in the selected region 
consists of gasoline: this means, according to (TMSA, 2018), about 70.000 Ton every year and, 
consequently, 1750 shipments per year. 
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Due to lack of statistics concerns the transport of Chlorine and Butane between the 
Tangier Med port and the Tangier-Tétouan region, we estimated that more than 1000 tankers 
transport Butane per year, and around 800 trucks transport chlorine. per year between the routes 
studied. 
Figure 35 shows the two alternative paths for the presented case study from Med Tangier 
Port to Tangier. The first route option (Path 1) to reach Tangier for the MTP has length 69.4 










Figure 35: Path 1 and Path 2 selected to transport gasoline from Med Tangier Port (MTP) to 
Tangier (TA) by truck. 
The length of the alternative route (Path 2) is 54.77 km completely on national road, 
which covers urban, suburban and rural area (Table 24). 
Table 24: Parameters for Path 1 and Path 2. 
path Route Length (Km) Population class Road class 
Path 1 
RN16 13.20 Suburban State road 
A4 51.87 Rural Highway 
RN1 4.30 Urban State road 
 










Figure 36 shows the two alternative paths for the presented case study from Med Tangier 
Port to Tétouan. The first route option (Path 1) to reach Tétouan for the MTP has length 79.18 











Figure 36: Path 1 and Path 2 selected to transport gasoline from Med Tangier Port (MTP) to 
Tétouan by truck. 
The length of the alternative route (Path 2) is 61.81 km completely on national road which 
covers urban, suburban and rural area (see Table 25). 
Table 25 Parameters for Path 1 and Path 2 for Tangier Med port to Tétouan case study: 
path Route Length (Km) Population class Road class 
Path 1 




RN2 38.59 State road 





A6 21.22 Suburban Highway 
RN16 12.58 Rural State road 
RN16 10.70 




III.1. Frequency analysis for the case study 
The values of road accident rates come from historical records, reported by Moroccan 
Ministry of Equipment, Transport, and Logistics. This source provides the following data: 
 1) Number of accidents occurred per year per road class (Highway, State, National and 
Provincial network) per 100.000 circulating vehicles;  
2) Total extension of each road class network on the territory. 
The values of the accident rate for each class of transport network in Morocco were as 
shown in table 26. The path route segmentation finds six different sections for the Path 1 while 
Path 2 consists of seven sections. Two different road classes (Highway and State road) and 
three population classes (Urban, suburban and rural) has been considered for Path 1. Path 2 
consists of only one road classes (State road) and three population classes (Urban, suburban 
and rural). Route details for the Path 1 and 2 for each case are listed in the table 27 to 30. 
Table 26: Accident rate for road transport in Morocco.  
Source (TMSA 2018) 
Network transport Accident rate [N /(vehicle.km)] 
Highway Network 1.904E-07 
State Network 4.016E-07 
Regional Network 1.789E-07 
Provincial Network 1.582E-07 
 
Table 27: Details of the road segments for path 1 (Tangier). 
PATH 1 
Segment Length [km] Road class Population class 
1 13.20 State Road Suburban 
2 9.17 Highway Rural 
3 11.37 Highway Rural 
4 17.00 Highway Rural 
5 14.37 Highway Rural 
6 4.30 State Road Urban 





Table 28: Details of the road segments for alternative path 2 (Tangier). 
PATH 2 
Segment Length [km] Road class Population class 
1 13.20 State Road Suburban 
2 6.77 State Road Suburban 
3 9.00 State Road Rural 
4 6.00 State Road Rural 
5 6.27 State Road Rural 
6 7.87 State Road Urban 
7 5.67 State Road Urban 
TOTAL 54.77   
 
Table 29: Details of the road segments for path 1 (Tétouan). 
PATH 1 
Segment Length [km] Road class Population class 
1 13.20 State Road Suburban 
2 17.97 Highway Rural 
3 13.68 State Road Rural 
4 24.91 State Road Rural 
5 9.42 State Road Urban 
TOTAL 79.18   
 
Table 30: Details of the road segments for alternative path 2 (Tétouan). 
PATH 2 
Segment Length [km] Road class Population class 
1 12.58 State Road Rural 
2 10.70 State Road Urban 
3 18.09 Highway Suburban 
4 9.13 Highway Suburban 
5 11.32 State Road Urban 
TOTAL 61.82   
 
III.2. Consequence analysis for the case study 
In the proposed approach, the Shortcut method has been used to compute the hazard 
radius and, consequently, the impact area. Anyway, in order to guarantee that this expeditious 
method provides relevant data, a comparison with the results coming from a software tool 
application to simulate accident scenario is provided to the readers. 
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The Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) tool and the Shortcut method 
has been applied to generate impact area of an accident on road involving a gasoline tank track. 
The data required to model the accident outcome case with Aloha software appear in Table 31. 
Table 31: Data required by Aloha to simulate hazmat scenario for the case study associate to 
Gasoline, Chlorine and Butane transport on road. 
CLASS Of 
DATA 
TYPE OF DATA VALUES 
SITE DATA 
Location: TANGIER, MOROCCO 
Building Air Exchanges 
Per Hour: 
0.50 (enclosed office) 
Time: January 24, 2017 1258 hours ST (user specified) 
CHEMICAL 
DATA 
Chemical Name: Gasoline Butane Chlorine 
ERPG-1 / AEGL-1 200 ppm 5500 ppm 0.5 ppm  
ERPG -2 / AEGL-2 1000 ppm 17000 ppm 2 ppm 
ERPG -3 / AEGL-3 4000 ppm 53000 ppm 20 ppm 
IDLH 5 mg/m3  10 ppm 
LEL 14000 ppm 16000 ppm  
UEL 74000 ppm 84000 ppm  




of Data)  
Wind / Stability 
Scenario I: 1.5 m/s (from EST) / (F: Moderately stable 
conditions) 
Scenario II: 14 m/s (from EST) / (D: Neutral conditions)  
Ground Roughness: urban or forest 
Cloud Cover: 5 tenths 
Air Temperature (C) 
Scenario I: Average minimum temperature: 13  
Scenario II: Average minimum temperature: 21 
Relative Humidity: 70% 
Description: 
Tank contains liquid 
Leak from hole in horizontal cylindrical tank  
Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) 
SOURCE 
STRENGTH 
 Tank Volume:  Tank is 95% full 
 
Accident scenarios, involving the inventoried hazardous substances, are carried out in 
order to estimate the impact on the surrounding population of such events. Three types of 
accidental events are considered because of their impacts on planning and emergency response: 
▪ toxic clouds; 
▪ fires; 
▪ explosions. 
Different scenarios have been simulated in ALOHA considering small, medium, and 
large spill size with two different weather atmospheric conditions (F and D) and for two kinds 
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of wind speed (1,5 and 14 m/sec). In the figure below , a pool fire scenario with large spill size 
located in Tangier appears. 
Given the assumption that gasoline has been transported by truck on road, also the 
Shortcut method has been applied. Shortcut method classifies gasoline as flammable liquid 
and it provides directly the relative table containing the hazard radius. Those values represent 
the hazard distances for each scenario outcome case computed considering two different 
weather atmospheric conditions (F2 and D5) and four different thresholds of lethality. 
 
Figure 37: hazard zones for the different scenarios computed by Aloha 
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Table 32, 33, 34 and 35, shows the hazard radii obtained applying the two methodologies 
for the same scenario at the same conditions.  
The values obtained differ little from one another and this fact assures the reliability of 
the proposed speditive method. The distances computed by Shortcut Method has been used to 
apply QRA and compute societal risk for the proposed logistic operation of the case study. 











small F: 1.5m/s 77 100 
small D: 14m/s 92 105 
medium F: 1.5m/s 134 130 
medium D: 14m/s 150 130 
large F: 1.5m/s 164 145 
large D: 14m/s 181 150 
 
Table 33: Distance from the source of release for Flash fire & UVCE scenarios for Gasoline   





Distance from the source of release (in the 
wind direction) (meters) 
Flash Fire  UVCE 
small F: 1.5m/s 358 404 
small D: 14m/s 103 127 
medium F: 1.5m/s 721 823 
medium D: 14m/s 171 208 
large F: 1.5m/s 860 975 






Table 34: Distance from the source of release for Flash fire & UVCE scenarios for Butane   







Distance from the source of 




By Shortcut Method 
                                                  
Flash Fire  UVCE Flash Fire  UVCE 
small F: 1.5m/s 383 420 250 150 
small D: 14m/s 125 137 170 105 
medium F: 1.5m/s 457 506 330 190 
medium D: 14m/s 142 170 200 140 
large F: 1.5m/s 457 506 430 250 
large D: 14m/s 142 170 260 170 
 
Table 35: Toxic Area of vapor cloud for Chlorine computed by Aloha and Shortcut expressed 
in meters. 










small F: 1.5m/s 2000 2000 
small D: 14m/s 684 960 
medium F: 1.5m/s 4000 2000 
medium D: 14m/s 3600 4500 
large F: 1.5m/s 4500 2000 
large D: 14m/s 5500 4500 
 
III.2. QRA application 
The societal risk has been computed for the two alternative proposed paths.  
To finalize the QRA application the following data has been used. A conditional 
probability value CRP =0.1 is take into account; small, medium and large spill size probability 
is set respectively as SSD =0.5, 0.3 and 0.2. The two meteorological condition D and F appear 
with the same probability PWS=0.5. 
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In order to estimate societal risk, it has been assumed that only a part of persons exposed 
in the impact area is effectively affected by the event (i.e exposures/100 (CCPS, 2008)). 
Based on the above assumptions, the FN curves have been calculated for the two paths, 
figure 38 and 39 show an example of results obtained for the transport of gasoline (the other 
scenarios are in appendix 1) . FN curve expresses the relationship between the annual accident 
probability F and the risk loss expressed as number N of fatalities 
The graph shows, as dotted lines, the limit curves of the ALARP zone, according to 
(DNV, 2014). The upper line (ALARP 1 line in the graph) is tolerability line, while the risks 
above this line is regarded as intolerable. The bottom line (ALARP 2 line in the graph) is the 
negligible risk line and risks below it can be considered as negligible. 
 
 









Figure 39: Flash fire scenario with large spill size of Gasoline located in the Tangier. 
 
It can be noticed that for the two different selected paths, the results obtained are relatively 
different. Concerned Tangier case study,  The Path 1 is quite contained in the ALARP zone 
while the Path 2 has a part which can be regarded intolerable. This latter alternative strategy is 
not favorable in term of risk. 
On the other hand, in the case of transport of these dangerous materials to the city of 
Tetouan we show tha thet two routes contined in  the ALARP zone , with a little danger of road 
used (path 1) as the  alternative path 2. 
The following two figures show a map of the degree of danger obtained for each segment 




Figure 40: risk mapping according to its degree of danger for each segment of the road 
network (MAPT – Tangier) 
 
Figure 41: risk mapping according to its degree of danger for each segment of the road 





The proposed approach could improve the hazmat road transport safety minimizing the 
population exposure by optimizing the scheduling of hazmat vehicle shipments in the planning 
phase. Hazmat operators could apply this methodology to define the routes at minimum risk. 
On the other hand, the possibility to evaluate FN curves according to risk acceptance criteria 
might provide basis for decisions on the implementation of risk-reducing measures. 
In the industrial context, the utility of the adoption of QRA decision tool for risk 
management is often underestimated. QRA could provide informed assessment of cost risk 
exposures with special relevance in the hazmat transportation context. Besides, it is able to offer 
significant data to define mitigation risk strategies. 
Due to the SoS nature of the hazmat transportation problem, the large amount of data and 
information required to perform the QRA have to be collected from the different subjects 
involved in these activities. Those constraints represent an open issue also due to the fact that 
hazmat traffic information is considered sensible data in terms of safety and security. The use 
of the proposed basic approach allows the user to carry out a speed QRA obtaining still 
significant risk values. In a real-time or operational decisional level framework, reliable data 
about risk, even if approximated, could be very suitable to identify immediately the value of 
risk for a hazmat accidental event. 
Anyway, at tactical and strategical decisional level, QRA for hazmat transport deserves 

















Chapter IV: Maritime risk analysis. 
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In case of an oil spill incident in the marine environment, it is mandatory to know the 
trajectory of the pollutant slicks, so as to organize the oil recovery operations and to protect the 
areas exposed to the risk of pollution. 
The development of oil spill drift models in inland waters and in the sea is based on the 
frequency of pollution incidents and to the harmful impact of these incidents on the 
environment. 
A Lagrangian model has been proposed to identify risk areas that could be affected in the 
occurrence of a spill incident. The proposed model was applied to the real case occurred in the 
Mediterranean Sea toward the French coast in in October 07, 2018, and the results have 
confirmed the reliability and relevance of the proposed model. The choice of the physical 
phenomena which should be taken into account in the modelling of oil slick drift in marine 
waters is conditioned, in the first place, by the realization of a detailed state of art. 
The oil spill is one of the most dangerous sources of pollution that threatens maritime 
safety because of its serious consequences especially in the Mediterranean where, are listed 
more than 100 million gallons of crude oil spilled annually (Hosein et al., 2019; Cláudio et al., 
2014). Statistically, 52 % of total oil spills in the Mediterranean come from shipping, compared 
to 48 % for other seas (Albakjaji, 2011).  
Generally speaking, maritime oil transport is safer than other types of goods transport. 
The storage tanks used in the transportation black products (fuel oil, tars), which are the most 
polluting products, often lack regular maintenance and structural quality (Le Couviour, 2008). 
White Petroleum Products (WPP) (i.e. gas oil, gasoline, kerosene, naphtha) are rather more 
dangerous because of their flammability, yet less polluting due to their volatility.  
Oil spills conduce the degradation of the marine flora and fauna (Witchaya et al., 2017; 
Al-Majed et al., 2012; A.Vega et al., 2009; Ventikos et al., 2004). Moreover, oil spills decrease 
sun lighting and air in the seawater. Consequently, tiny plants and animals that form the 
plankton disappear affecting the overall food chain.  
A released petroleum product is subjected to the effects of the environment which 
generates its dispersion in the marine environment and, simultaneously, it modifies its physical 
and chemical characteristics, the so-called "weathering” of the oil (Mishra et al., 2015). The 
behavior of oil drift at sea is the result of a set of interactions that occur between the spilled 
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product and the external environment conditions. When hydrocarbons are discharged at sea, 
they suffer a large number of transformation processes: drift and spreading, evaporation, 
dissolution, dispersion, emulsification, photo-oxidation, biodegradation, sedimentation, 
pouring, stranding and interaction with sea ice. While some processes are currently well-
understood, such as spreading and evaporation, others remain poorly known (photooxidation 
and biodegradation).   
In this study, a maritime risk model based on the 2D Lagrangian model has been 
developed and validated. The proposed oil spill model considers the spreading effect, advection 
and diffusion processes. The purpose of the proposed paper is twofold. Firstly, it aims at 
defining a simple methodology to classify the risk in marine and coastal area due to maritime 
hazardous material transportation. Secondly, the proposed approach provides a useful tool 
which can support the spill response teams and other operators in facilitating oil spill planning 
and preparedness.  
The following section of the chapter represents a review of the main shipping accidents 
accompanied by the massive oil spills in the Mediterranean Sea. The third part introduces the 
proposed Oil Spill Model. In the section 4, the application of the proposed model is described 
in the context of a potential maritime accident in the Strait of Gibraltar in the Mediterranean 
Sea. 
I. Some data on maritime traffic  
Worldwide shipping traffic can be summarized in some key elements. Hydrocarbons 
transported by sea represent an annual figure of between 1200 and 1500 million tons (Mt) for 
crude oils and between 200 and 350 million tons (Mt) for refined products (gasoline, domestic 
fuels, heavy fuels, bitumen), transported by a fleet of about 6,500 ships (Marchand, 2003). 
I.1. Insights on the Mediterranean 
The Mediterranean Sea is a semi-closed warm and salty sea. The renewal of its superficial 
water mass is done completely only by the Strait of Gibraltar in 70 to 100 years (Albakjaji, 
2011), only the 13 kilometers of the Strait of Gibraltar that separates it from the Atlantic Ocean. 
That's why the Mediterranean has a low tidal range and undergoes greater evaporation (3130 




I.2. The characteristics of maritime transport in the Mediterranean 
The Mediterranean Sea is a very important transit area for transporting various goods and 
especially petroleum products. According to the estimates of Malta's Regional Center for 
Emergency Response to Accidental Marine Pollution (REMPEC),  more than 400 million tons 
annually are transported for more than nine thousand trips in the Mediterranean Sea, and 
represent approximately 20 % of world traffic, between 250 and 300 tankers crossing the sea 
every day (REMPEC, 2018). 
The Mediterranean Sea represents 0.7 % of the surface of the water and receives 17 % of 
the world marine pollution by hydrocarbons. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 
tons of crude oil are thrown into the sea each year by shipping activities (Greenpeace 
International, 2010). 
Accidental oil spills occur frequently with an average of 60 spills per a year in the 
Mediterranean, 15 of which involve ships that spill oil and chemicals. They can occur at any 
time in any part of the Mediterranean (European Environment Agency, 1999). 
I.3. Sources of oil pollution in the Mediterranean Sea 
Oil pollution related to maritime transport activities in the Mediterranean Sea has two 
main origins (operational pollution, accidental pollution).  
❖ Accidental Pollution may result in the loss of cargo or fuels as a result of grounding, 
collision and minor accidents occurring on board the ship, thus accidental pollution is random. 
❖ Operational pollution results from the discharge of ship-generated wastes such as 
garbage, sewage, dirty bilge water, and tank cleaning water as well as engine exhaust and tank 
ventilation emissions.  
Accidental pollution, illustrated by massive oil pollution, is however less important in 
quantity than operational pollution. Oil spills caused by accidents account for at least 30 % of 
this pollution, compared with 70 % for operational pollution (Albakjaji, 2011).  
Accidental spills attract the attention of the public, the media and politicians, while 
operational pollution does not have this character, this is due to a lack of information on its 
frequency and its harmful effects on the environment marine. In addition, accidental pollution 
appears to be more irritating than any other categories of marine oil pollution, probably because 
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of their concentrated nature. Large quantities of oil released on a limited marine surface for a 
short period of time. 
I.4. Historical spill accidents 
The major accidents oil spill occurred in the world can be summarized in the following table: 







Grounding of a tanker in charge near the English Cornish coast: the 
first massive oil spill (119,000 tons) in the history of shipping, and 




16 March 1978 
Grounding of a tanker in charge on the Breton coast (the largest spill 





Collision and fire of two tankers in charge of crude oil (500,000 
tons) off Trinidad: a larger oil spill (280,000 tons of crude oil, partly 
burned). 
Tanio 7 March 1980 
Breakdown of a tanker in charge (26,000 tons of crude oil), causing 
a small spill (6,000 tons), but in an area affected two years earlier 




24 March 1989 
Grounding of a tanker in charge (180,000 tons of crude oil) in 




explosion of an Iranian oil tanker carrying 284,000 tons of crude oil 
and drifting along the Moroccan coast, between Safi and Larache, 
leaving slicks of water hydrocarbons at a rate of 200 tons per hour. 
Haven 11 April 1991 
Fire and explosion of a tanker in charge (144,000 tons of crude oil), 






Grounding of a tanker in charge at the entrance of the Port of 
Corunna, Spain: an average spill (80,000 tons of crude oil, 
combustion of the part), but in a zone of very strong fisheries 
exploitation. 
Braer 5 January 1993 
Stranding of a tanker in charge on a rocky coast of the Shetland 
Islands: on average spill (84,500 tons of crude oil) in exceptionally 





Grounding of a tanker in charge (130,000 tons of crude oil) at the 
entrance to Milford Haven Bay, Wales: an average spill (73,000 
tons), subject of a dispersant treatment of a dimension never before 
seen. 
Katja 7 August 1997 
The pollution of the oil tanker Katja in the Port of Le Havre 
illustrates an essential fact: an accidental spill of hydrocarbons, 
altogether modest, compared to major accidents. The quantity 
transported: 80,000 tons, the quantity dumped 187m3. The factor 




Breakdown of a tanker in charge (31,000 tons of heavy fuel oil) off 
Brittany: the first large spill of heavy fuel oil (20,000 tons) and a 




Breakdown of a tanker in charge (77,000 tons of heavy fuel oil) off 
Galicia: a heavy fuel oil spill (estimated at 64,000 tons), the 
European record for the length of affected coastline (more than 
3,000km) and unprecedented wreck relief (13,000 tons recoveree 
more than 3,800 m of background). 
 
II. State of art in the Mediterranean Sea 
The Mediterranean Sea is a tragic theater of maritime accidents. In 1991, the Haven 
disaster in the coastal area of Genoa in Italy, which produced the release of 144,000 tons of 
hydrocarbons,  has been ranked as the fourth dangerous event among global shipping accidents 
(P Guidetti et al., 2000). In addition, the Mediterranean is threatened by accidents occurring 
outside its geographical area. For example, the maritime accident that occurred in the Atlantic 
Ocean as a result of a collision between the oil tanker «Seat Spirit», which was carrying heavy 
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oil, and «Hesperus», which transported chemical products, caused a spill of 12,200 tons of oil. 
However, depending on weather conditions (wind speed and ocean currents), the contaminants 
were transferred by the Strait of Gibraltar to the Moroccan, Spanish and Algerian coasts 
(LAOTBOZZI, 2009) 
 According to recent statistics from the “Alerts and Accidents database” (REMPEC, 
2018), containing data on spills (quantity, type of spilled oil, location and on the ships involved) 
and accidents likely to cause oil spills in Mediterranean Sea. 979 marine accidents occurred 
between 1977 and 2017. These accidents cause various spills (petroleum products, chemicals... 
etc.). About 497,117 tons of oil were dumped into the Mediterranean Sea as a result of 
accidents.  
In relation to oil spills, 268 tankers are involved in maritime accidents in the 
Mediterranean Sea in the same period (90 accidents for “Volatile Oil” and 178 for “non-Volatile 
oil”), as shown in the following table: 
Table 37: Number of oil spill accidents in the Mediterranean Sea between 1977 and 2017 
 
According to these statistics, we note that the number of accidents involving accidental 
spills decreased between 1998 and 2007, with 46 and 28 accidents occurred respectively. This 
decrease can be attributed to the implementation of international, regional and national 
legislations and particularly at the level of European countries (the key Points). The European 
Union has put in place a series of strict measures (Erika I and Erika II... etc.) to control ships 
entering European ports. Also, the application of modern methods safer in the shipbuilding 
industry (Albakjaji, 2011). But despite this, we notice that between the years 2008 and 2017 
years Number of accidents 
Type of pollutant 
Volatile Oil Non-volatile Oil 
Between 1977 and 1987 46 3 43 
Between 1988 and 1997 73 5 68 
Between 1998 and 2007 28 3 25 
Between 2008 and 2017 121 79 42 
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the number of accidents to increases again especially in Greece which represents 112 accidents 
of spill on 121 accidents in the Mediterranean.  
Greece holds the record for oil spilled in the main incidents, with 378,027 tons, followed 
immediately by Italy with almost 364,823 tons and Spain with 333,492 tons (REMPEC, 2018) 
It should be noted that incidents occurring in the European parts are more frequent than 
in other parts of the Mediterranean, statically speaking 232 incidents in European 
Mediterranean countries out of 268 incidents in all the Mediterranean (Table 38). This Increase 
in the European part is due to the concentration of the petrochemical industries, (in Italy alone, 
there are 14 oil ports and 17 refineries) (Albakjaji, 2011). Without forgetting the increase in 
trade between European countries because European integration and economic development 
measures of these countries, (traffic between EU countries which is essentially bulk traffic). 
The impact appears also in the proximity-related intensity of densities between Gibraltar and 
Spain on the one hand, and between Sicily and Italy on the other. The relatively high density 
between Gibraltar and Sicily reflects the importance of the Western Mediterranean as a transit 












Figure 42:distribution of oil spills in Mediterranean Sea 1977-2017 
(Source: REMPEC, S. Polinov) 
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Table 38: The main oil spill accidents in the Mediterranean for the period 1977 - 2017 






Cause of the accident 
Quantity 
spilled (tons) 














failure of the 
installation 





Algeria 5  1   1 1    2 2 2 1  5 
Croatia 5      5     1 4   5 
Cyprus 7  2    2    3 4 3   7 
Egypt 5      3   1 1 1 4   5 
France 3      1   2   2 1  3 
Greece 161 1 36 49 1 19 5 8  10 32 71 74 16 81 80 
Israel 13  3   1 1   2 6 6 7  2 11 
Italy 39   1  4 12  1 10 11 22 12 5 3 36 
Lebanon 5      1  1  3 2 2 1 2 3 
Libya 1     1      1    1 
Malta 5     2 1    2 3 2   5 
Montenegro 2          2  2  1 1 
Spain 10  1   1 1   1 6 4 4 2 1 9 
Syria 1      1      1   1 
Tunisia 2     1 1     1 1   2 
Turkey 4     3     1 3 1   4 
Total  268 1 43 50 1 33 35 8 2 26 69 121 121 26 90 178 
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II.1. Statistics on spilled quantities 
For historical reasons, oil spills generally classified by size (<7 tons between, 7-700 tons 
and >700 tons), although the actual amount spilled is also recorded. Now the information is 
available in several databases as REMPEC or ITOPF, nearly 10,000 incidents, the vast majority 
(84%) belong to the smallest category, i.e. <7 tons (ITOPF, 2006). 
It should be noted that figures for the amount of oil spilled in an incident include all oil 
lost to the environment, including that which is burned or remains in a sunken vessel. There is 
considerable annual variation in both the impact of oil spills and the amount of oil lost. 
The incidence of major spills is relatively low and a detailed statistical analysis is rarely 
possible; therefore, the focus is on identifying trends. For example, the table below shows that 
the number of large spills (> 700 tons) has decreased significantly over the last 20 years. The 
average number of large spills per year during the 2000s was less than one-third of that observed 
during the 1980s. It should be noted that all 10 spills between 2008 and 2017 occurred in 
Greece. 
Table 39: Number of spills and quantities by years in the Mediterranean, between 1977 and 
2017  















Number of spill 
accidents 
20 36 17 48 
Total Quantity (tons) 31 57 18 105 
7<x<700 
Number of spill 
accidents 
18 31 9 63 
Total Quantity (T) 2595 5150 1835 9378 
>700 
Number of spill 
accidents 
8 6 2 10 
Total Quantity (T) 283170 151700 3000 74700 







Most incidents result from a combination of actions and circumstances, all of which 
contribute to varying degrees to the end result. The following analysis explores the impact of 
spills of different sizes in terms of primary event or ongoing operation at the time of the spill. 
These "causes" have been grouped into "Operational" and "Accidental". Spills for which 
relevant information is not available or for which the cause is not one of those listed are listed 
under "Other". 
Table 40: Number of incidences of spills by accident size in the Mediterranean, between 1977 
and 2017 
Type of spill 
Quantity spilled (tons) 
Total 
<7 7<x<700  >700 
operational    
Loading / unloading 17 16  2 35 
Leaking oil or gas 10 36  4 50 
Other operations 2 1   3 
accidental  
 
Collision 8 13  5 26 
grounding 21 8  4 33 
Structural failure of the installation 3 5   8 
Fire or explosion 0 0  1 1 
shipwreck 22 17  4 43 
Other 38 25  6 69 
 
From the table 40, we will notice that: 
▪ Most spills of tankers in the Mediterranean Sea are the result of accidental causes such 
as stranding, collisions and shipwrecks, which generally result in much larger spills; 
▪ most tanker spills result from routine operations such as loading, unloading and 
bunkering that normally occur at ports or oil terminals; 
▪ the majority of these spills are small to medium-sized, approximately 53% of the 
incidents for quantities between 7 and 700 tons. 
The following figures (43 and 44) represent percentages of different causes of spills in 




Figure 43: incidence of spills <700 tons by cause, 1977-2017 
 




We can therefore summarize all the incidents of spills in the Mediterranean between 1977 
and 2017 in the following graph. 
 
Figure 45: The different causes of spills in the Mediterranean Sea between 1977 and 2017. 
 
III. Hydrocarbon weathering process 
 The behavior of hydrocarbons at sea depends strongly on the nature of the spilled 
products. Then must also be account the area of the spill (coastal zone, estuary, offshore) and 
the weather-ocean conditions (tide, currents, wind, agitation of the sea, sunshine). 
A petroleum product is subjected to the effects of the environment which causes the 
dispersion in the marine environment and at the same time modifies their physical state and 
their chemical characteristics; what is called the weathering of oil. None accident is precisely 
the same; the behavior of hydrocarbons released at sea is the result of a set of interactions that 
exists between the spilled product and the external environment. 
Remind us that the crude oils are complex mixture and variable of hydrocarbons; that’s 
why their consistency may be from a volatile liquid to that of a viscous semi-solid. The refined 
products represent different distillation fractions of crude oils in the ascending order by their 
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density: gasolines, kerosene, fuels, lubricating oils, residual fuels, bitumen; also, a petroleum 
product is characterized by a chemical composition and its physical properties. 
There are two categories of hydrocarbons; the aliphatic hydrocarbons which are 
composed of linear open chain (n-alkanes), or cyclical (Naphthenes) with five or six carbon 
atoms (cyclopentane or cyclohexane) with polycyclic combinations. Aromatic hydrocarbons 
are consisted of an aromatic nucleus (benzene derivatives) or more aromatic nuclei (poly-
aromatic hydrocarbons) (Doerffer, 1992). 
In general, aromatic hydrocarbons are the main cause of the eco-toxicological impact of 
oil pollution on aquatic ecosystems. Resins and asphaltenes represent heterocyclic molecules 
(N, S, O) with high molecular weight. This fraction also contains metals such as nickel and 
vanadium. The effects on aquatic fauna and flora are not clearly known and the assessment of 
such polymers is almost totally excluded from chemical analysis (Marchand, 2003). 
The most important physical properties that affect the behavior of a petroleum product 
discharged into the marine environment are: 
• Density: hydrocarbons almost always have a density below 1, which allows them to 
float (normalized value between 800–1000 kg/m3) (Speight, 2006). However, as a result of 
aging phenomena (evaporation & emulsification), the density gradually increases to values 
close to those of water, making their buoyancy more uncertain; 
• The distillation characteristics, which have a flash point that represents the temperature 
from which a heated product will give off flammable vapors; 
• The pour point is the temperature at which it stops flowing; 
• The viscosity represents the flow resistance, high viscosity hydrocarbons flow less 
easily than those with lower viscosity. 
The viscosity of the spilled oil influences the rate of spill spread, the adhesion capacities 
of the oil, its penetration into soil and beach sediments and the ability of pumps used in a 
cleaning operation to remove oil from the surface (Doerffer, 1992). 
The transport of a slick of oil is generally induced by the current, the wind, the waves and 
the turbulent diffusion. Wind and currents are the two major processes that constitute the 
phenomenon of convection in the marine environment (ASCE, 1996; Jordi et al., 2006; 
Carracedo et al., 2006; Guo, 2009; Cheng et al., 2011). There are two types of convection: 
convection at the surface of the water level, which a slick "floating» is related to wind friction 
and surface current (an oil slick moves in a direction and speed equal to around 3% of the vector 
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sum and about 100% of the wind speed of the velocity of the current (Reed et al., 1999; Chao 
et al., 2001; McCay, 2004; Guo et al., 2009; Periáñez et al., 2010). 
The second run in the water column and causes hydrocarbon particles with suspended or 
dissolved. However, of the convection, the turbulence generated by wave overwash and the 
shear forces exerted by the coasts and sea floor had an effect the break up the slicks surface and 
spread it horizontally and vertically. 
The most physicochemical processes resulting the change in physical properties of the 
hydrocarbon discharged at sea over time (figure 46). 
Figure 46: Weathering process of oil spill 
(Source:  ITOPF, 2013) 
 
In general, there are two distinct phases during processes an active and predominant part: 
III.1. Short-term evolution phase 
Intervenes in the first days and following the spill marked by the following processes: 
III.1.1. Spreading of the slick 
Spreading is one of the most important processes, not only for predicting the extent of pollution, 
but also because it conditions other processes of slick transformation. Indeed, spreading grows 
the exchange surfaces and increases the mass transfer by evaporation and dissolution. Table 41 
represent the three phases of hydrocarbon spreading after spillage over time (Fay, 1971). 
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Table 41: Phases of hydrocarbon spreading after spillage over time 
Phase Driving force Resistive force 
1 Gravity Inertia  
2 Gravity Viscosity 
3 Surface tension Viscosity 
 
The spread of a slick involves the forces below (Goeury, 2012):  
▪ Gravitational forces: gravity forces; 
▪ Surface tension forces: surface tensions at the water-air interfaces, hydrocarbon-air, 
water-hydrocarbon; 
▪ Viscosity forces: viscous friction at the water-oil interface. 
III.1.2. The evaporation of the light fractions 
Evaporation is the most important transformation process in mass transfer during the first 
two days for the evolution of the spill. It varies according to the nature of the hydrocarbon, 
where it can evaporate completely in the case of a gasoline or a diesel fuel, in the order of 40 
to 50% in the case of a light crude oil and approximately 10 to 15% in the case of a heavy fuel 
oil (Bocard, 2006). 
Evaporation is influenced by the nature of the hydrocarbon (density, viscosity), the 
temperature of the sea water, the wind speed and the slick surface due to spreading. 
III.1.3. The dissolution of the most soluble compounds 
Generally, it is estimated that a very small part of the hydrocarbon mass will dissolve in 
the water. However, the most soluble compounds are often the most toxic, although the 
dissolution in very small quantities of these substances can have a very strong ecological 
impact. 
The physical process of dissolution is well known but the description of a hydrocarbon 
spill is complex because of the numbers of components constituting in the product. And it’s a 
priori necessary to know the dissolution of each of the components. 
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Evaporation is another factor involved when it comes to describing dissolution. Indeed, 
the solubility and volatility of the components are very strongly correlated; more soluble a 
compound, the more volatile it is. 
Mass transfer due to evaporation predominates on that of dissolution. Thus, the mass of 
the oil slick decreases over time. This depletion within slick reduces the rate of transfer of 
dissolved matter into the water and there may be direct evaporation of the dissolved components 
in the water. 
III.2. A phase of long-term 
This phase takes place over weeks, months or even years. This second phase of evolution 
is associated with the phase of decontamination of the marine environment as result of the 
energy level of the contaminated sites: 
III.2.1. Mechanical energy of the environment: natural dispersion 
The dispersal at sea is caused by wave breaking which splits the slick into droplets of 
different sizes. These droplets are submitted to vertical movements related to their buoyancy 
and turbulence in the environment. Smaller droplets, with reduced buoyancy, will tend to stay 
in the water column or begin to flow, while the large droplets will resurface at the back of the 
slick. Indeed, surface slick moves by wind and current effect, while the droplets within the 
water column are submitted by current effect. Those moves less rapidly than the surface water 
when resurface, they are located behind the slick (Elliott et al.,1986). 
III.2.3. Solar energy: photo-oxidation 
Photo-oxidation is a process of oxidation of the silk as a result of ultra-violet solar 
radiation. This process, negligible in the first few hours, it’s gains importance after a week. 
III.2.3. Biological energy: biodegradation 
Biodegradation is due to the presence of micro-organism in the water it may take several 
years. Whether some processes are well understood such as spreading and evaporation the 
others not well enough known (photooxidation and biodegradation). All these phenomena are 





IV. A Lagrangian-based maritime and coastal risk model formulation 
In the literature,  the oil spill represents one of the main concerns in the context of risk analysis 
of maritime transportation due to the potential impact on marine ecosystems, to socio-economic 
activities and to the huge efforts in terms of recovery and clean-up operations (Nelson et al., 2018; Xin 
Liu et al., 2009; Burgherr, 2007). 
Different risk definitions exist in the literature involving components such as probability, 
uncertainty, frequency of specific events, and/or related consequences. In (Goerlandt et al., 2015), a 
review of methods and applications for maritime transportation risk analysis have been presented. 
In the proposed approach, the risk (𝑅) is associated with the expected value of the probability (𝑃) 
of an accident occurrence with a given spill size in a specific sea area and the outcome arising as a 
consequence (𝐶) of the oil slick movement (Goerlandt et al., 2015). The risk (R) is defined as probability 
(P) times consequence (C), (CCPS, 2008): 
𝑹 = 𝑷 ×  𝑪                                                                                                                        (1) 
IV.1. Accident probability analysis 
The probability of maritime traffic accident occurrence is usually modelled by statistical 
approach which is based on historical documentations about accident and non-accident rates, 
failures equipment, spill or release probabilities and container designs.  
In the proposed model, the oil spill probability 𝑃𝑖, at the marine location i-th, is computed 
throug the combination of three different components:  
𝑷𝒊 = 𝑨𝑹𝒊 × 𝑷𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 × 𝑷 𝒊
𝒘𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓
                                                                                   (2) 
Where: 
𝑨𝑹𝒊 is the yearly accident rate for a specific geographic region which the location i-th 
belongs to. Assuming to be known a set of statistical data about accidents occurred in a 
predefined sea area, 𝐴𝑅𝑖 may be computed as  
𝑨𝑹𝒊  =
# 𝒐𝒊𝒍 𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕   




]                                                                                      (3) 
- 𝑷𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆, is the probability of different release sizes in case of the accident occurrence. 
Three release sizes were defined: small (release <70 tons), medium (release between 70 and 





#  𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔  𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒊𝒍 𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆
#  𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
                                                        (4) 
- 𝑷 𝒊
𝒘𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓
: the probability of weather stability, in the location i-th, which represents the 
probability of different combinations of atmospheric conditions for wind speed and directions 
based on frequency analysis. Statistical data are available in open-source database for different 
Mediterranean areas.  
IV.2. Consequence modelling 
Currently, the consequence modelling is classified into two generations models according 
to their analysis in two or three dimensions (2D and 3D models).  Those models have been 
developed to predict the evolution and behavior of hydrocarbons spilled on the surface and into 
the deepwater. This choice of dimension analysis directly influences the complexity of the 
model and the accuracy of the expected results. The 2D models (A Hardeo, 2011; Janeiro et al., 
2008; Vethamony et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2005; Beegle-Krausel, 2001; Chao et al., 2001) run 
quickly but they do not allow to obtain detailed information on the water column contamination 
(Cedric, 2012)  focusing only on the study of surface transport processes (Malcolm, 2017). The 
3D models (El-Fadel et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2008; Carracedo et al., 2006)  provide a 
description of the flow over the entire water column (surface, subsurface transport and fate 
processes) (Malcolm, 2017). The latter models will give rise to more accurate results to simulate 
oil spills, yet more parameters have to be defined to get precise results. The decision to develop 
a 2D or 3D model strongly depends on the data that would be available to use as inputs. Upon 
the occurrence of a spill incident, the oil may stagnate as suspensions in the water column for 
a prolonged period due to the formation of emulsions. When emulsions processes are formed, 
the impact of the spill increases. As a consequence, the response and cleaning efforts become 
more complicated. Inclusion of the vertical movement of particles often makes the model very 
complex, as it will require detailed oceanographic information about the region for which the 
model is developed (Hardeo et al., 2016).  
 The 2D spreading models are based mostly on the Lagrangian approaches (Cedric, 2012). 
The Lagrangian based models consider the oil slick as the movements of a set of small droplets 
subjected to wind, waves, and currents, and which can rise or sink due to buoyancy (Nordam et 
al., 2019). Several studies use the Lagrangian model to determine the areas that would be 
affected in the event of an oil spill (Kankara, 2016; Xu et al., 2013; Marta-Almeida et al., 2013; 
Delpeche et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2012; Havens et al., 2009). 
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In the proposed approach, a 2D Lagrangian based consequence model has been defined 
and used to compute maritime risk. The spreading, advection and diffusion processes which 
draw the oil spill trajectory and the consequently impacted area of the spill accidents are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
Spreading is one of the most relevant processes, not only because it guarantees the 
prediction of the extent of oil slick area. But also, because it affects all other oil slick 
transformation processes. 
Two physical phenomena lead to an oil slick movement on the surface water. First, the 
slick is subject to the spreading process under the influence of mechanical forces such as 
gravity, inertia, viscosity and interfacial tension and, on the other hand, to turbulent diffusion.  
The oil slick extension in the wind direction is expected to increase with time 
proportionally to the wind speed, while the lateral elongation is always described by the gravity-
spread equation described by Fay (Fay, 1971). 
The Fay spreading model (Fay, 1971) is one of the most widely used models (ASCE, 
1996; Cekirge et al., 1995). It divides the spread of the oil slick into three phases. In the first 
phase (gravity inertial stage), which lasts one hour, the slick is subjected to gravity forces 
balanced by inertia forces. During the second phase, so-called gravity viscous spreading, which 
may be extended to a week, gravity and viscosity forces prevail. Beyond the week, only the 
viscosity is taken into account.  
According to (Fay, 1971), the time t0 which concludes the first gravity inertial phase may 












                                                                                                               (5)                                                                                                
Where: 
-  k1and k2are empirical coefficients ( k1 = 1.14 and k2 =1.45  (Fay, 1971));  
- V0  is volume of oil spilled (m
3);  
- ϑmis the kinematic viscosity of water(m
2 s⁄ );  
- g is gravitational acceleration(m s2⁄ );  
- ∆ρ is the relative density difference between the water and oil given by: 
   ∆𝝆 =
𝝆𝒘−𝝆𝒐𝒊𝒍
𝝆𝒘
                                                                                                                          (6) 
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Where ρw is the density of water (g cm
3⁄ )and ρoil is the density of oil (g cm
3⁄ ). 
The area Ao affected by the oil spreading at time t0, at the end of the gravity inertial phase, 









𝟐 )                                                                                                                 (7) 
In the next gravity viscous spreading phase, the area 𝐴(𝑡) of the oil slick during the time 
horizon may be computed using a correlation developed by (Berry, 2012), which assumes that 
oil slick spreading may have an elliptical shape on the water’s surface with the major axis 
oriented in the direction of the wind. 
The area covered by the oil slick, At , at time t-th, from the time t0 , is described by 
𝑨𝒕  =  
𝟏
𝟒
𝝅𝑸𝒕𝑹𝒕                                                                                                                        (8) 
The length of the minor ellipse axis, 𝑄𝑡, is given by (9):  
𝑸𝒕 = 𝟏. 𝟕(∆𝝆𝑽𝟎)
𝟏 𝟑⁄ 𝒕𝟏 𝟒⁄                                    (9)      
where V0 is the volume of oil spill, the time t-th is the number of time units starting from the time t0,                                                                        
The length of the major axis of the ellipse, 𝑅𝑡, is described by 
𝑹𝒕 = 𝑸𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑 ∗ (𝑼𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒅)
𝟒 𝟑⁄ (𝒕)𝟑 𝟒⁄                                                                                                     (10) 
Where 𝑈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 is the wind speed. 
◼ Advection and diffusion 
The transport of an oil slick is generally induced by surface current, wind, waves and 
turbulent diffusion. Indeed, 60 to 65% of the oil slick remains on the surface. Wind and currents 
are the two major processes composing the phenomenon of advection the slick. This surface 
current is largely wind generated, but in high tides regions tidal currents may dominate. 
In this two-dimensional model of oil spill, the initial area of oil slick is divided into a large number 
of distinct Lagrangian particles in a XY plane reference at the water surface where (xt, yt) represent the 
position of a particle at a time step t. 
 It is assumed that these particles are connected to the surrounding body of water and therefore 
diffuse from a random process. The advection and diffusion properties of each particle can be calculated 
based on the flow fields at the water surface and the wind speed. Consequently, the speed, as well as the 
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displacement of these particles, can be solved. Once their coordinates are determined at each time step, 
the shape and trace of the spill can be decided. 
▪ Advection velocity 
A large number of models of oil slick drift use a constant parameter to relate the surface 
wind speed to the drift of the slick. This parameter is taken equal to about 3.5% for wind speed 
(Berry, 2012; Periáñez et al., 2010; Guo et al., 2009; Ambjorn, 2007; McCay-French, 2004; 
ASCE, 1996; Al-Rabeh et al., 1989). The oil slick is then supposed to drift on water at 3.5% of 
the wind speed combined with 100% of the current speed.  The advective velocity (Ua) of the 
oil slick due to wind (Uwind) and surface current (Ucurrent) effects is given (Berry, 2012):  
𝑼𝒂 =  𝑼𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑𝟓 𝑼𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒅                                                                                              (11) 
Where 𝑈𝑎is the advective velocity of the oil slick (m/s), 𝑈𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the surface current 
(m/s) and 𝑈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 is wind speed (m/s). 
▪ Horizontal turbulent diffusion 
Generally, the Lagrangian approach represent the turbulent diffusion considering that the 
surface or suspended particles of the slick are subject to a random movement in addition to the 
regular movement due to the main current in the sea (Wang et al., 2008). 
The translations, respectively ∆Xdiff and ∆Ydiff , due to the diffusion phase, during a time 
step Δt of the particles in the X and Y directions are based on (Al-Rabeh, 1989): 
∆𝑿𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇 = [𝑹]𝟎
𝟏√𝟏𝟐𝑫𝒉∆𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒔𝜽                                                                                                       (12) 
∆𝒀𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇 = [𝑹]𝟎
𝟏√𝟏𝟐𝑫𝒉∆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒏𝜽                                                                                                        (13) 
Where [R]0
1 is a random number between 0 and 1 from a uniform distribution, Dh: 
horizontal diffusion coefficient; and θ is the directional angle θ = 2πR. 
Thus, the displacement of the oil slick due to advection and horizontal diffusion is given 
as (Berry et al., 2012): 
𝐗𝐭+𝟏 = 𝐱𝐭 + 𝐮𝐚,𝐱(𝐱𝐭, 𝐲𝐭)∆𝐭 + ∆𝐱𝐝𝐢𝐟𝐟                                                                                      (14) 




− 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 is the location of the particles at time step t-th,  
− 𝑢𝑎,𝑥 and 𝑢𝑎,𝑦 are the advective velocities in the X and Y directions respectively, 
− ∆𝑡 is the time-step interval (s) 
− ∆𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓, ∆𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓  are the displacements of the particles in the X and Y directions 
respectively. 
V. Case study in the Mediterranean Sea (incident of Saint Tropez) 
The proposed model has been tested to evaluate the oil spill propagation in the case of the 
accident in the Tyrrhenian Sea occurred of the coast of Corsica on October 7th 2018, between 
a Cypriot container ship and a Tunisian ship. According to public authorities estimation, the 
accident consisted in a release of about 600 m3 of oil (Vazquez, 2018) (figure 47 & 48). 
 
 
Figure 47: Aerial view of boats collided off the coast of Corsica, 10 October 2018 




Figure 48: A satellite image of the alleged fuel slick at the origin of this pollution, taken the 
day after the collision between the two ships 
(Source: .(https://www.futura-sciences.com/planete/ 2018)) 
V.1. Weather conditions 
In order to apply the proposed method, a whether condition analysis in the selected area 
for the time horizon of 9 days starting from the October 7th, 2018 has been carried out. The 
main environmental information necessary for reliable prediction of oil slick movement are 
related to the wind, water surface current, and waves that varied in time and space. Accurate 
information of these dynamic forcing conditions is important and fundamental to produce a 
precise model of oil spill trajectory. 
During the incident period (9 days), the wind blew ranging from 13 km/h to 46 km/h, 
predominantly in the north-east direction according to data coming from the database Spanish 
Network of Measurements (REMRO Network), although the wind turned during all the 
compass. The Table 42 shows the values of the wind speed during the selected period in the 
coastal area of Saint Tropez. Besides, the surface current of the sea water was about 1 m/s 
during the overall period. The figure 49 displays the wind rose averages in the incident area 









07 October 2019 13 3.6 
08 October 2019 36 10 
09 October 2019 29 8.05 
10 October 2019 44 12.22 
11 October 2019 29 8.05 
12 October 2019 14 3.88 
13 October 2019 17 4.72 
14 October 2019 34 9.44 
15 October 2019 46 12.77 
 
 
Figure 49 : Monthly Wind Rose averages in the incident area during the incident period 
(October) 
 
Due to the high-speed values for wind (>8 m/s) in that period, the public authorities didn’t 
have the possibility to apply recovery actions before the oil slick arrived on the coast. Oil 
residues reached the French beaches, including Pampelonne in the Gulf of Saint-Tropez, within 
nine days after the collision of two ships off the French island of Corsica. More than16 
kilometres (10 miles) of coastline had been affected by the spill. Nearly 50 beaches were 
affected in 11 French municipalities: Escalet, Pampelonne in Ramatuelle, Salins and Moutte in 
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Saint-Tropez, La Nartelle-Saint Barth in Sainte-Maxime were closed to public (le nouvelliste, 
2018). 
V.2. Model application 
The proposed model was applied to simulate the trajectory of the spilled oil for the 
selected case study in 9 days from the 7th to 15th October 2018. 
In the simulated scenario, from the beginning of the incident, in the first 24 hours, the oil 
slick was directed toward south-west and it covered a distance approximately of 6 km. In the 
real case, the observed data confirmed that the model predicts quite accurately the horizontal 
movement of the surface oil slick.  
In the simulated scenario, from October 8th to 9th, the oil slick travelled a distance 
approximately of 15km. During the fourth day, when a very high wind speed (44 km/h) has 
been observed, the oil slick covered a distance approximately of 50km.  From the 11th to the 
13th October, the oil slick travelled a distance approximately of 87 Km. During the period from 
October 14th to 15th, the oil slick moved in the direction of Saint Tropez spreading for more 
than 160 km. 
The simulation results about the movements of the oil slick during the incident period 
shows that the trajectory and timing obtained by the proposed model correspond 
approximatively with the actual trajectory and timing carried out by the oil spill slick in the real 
case study in the Tyrrhenian Sea. 
In 9 days, the oil spill slick reached the coast out Saint Tropez covering about 230 km. 
The same results are obtained by the proposed model simulation for the oil slick propagation. 
Figure 50 displays the actual distance covered in the selected time horizon. While figure 51 
shows the simulated distribution of oil spill for each day of the time horizon. Both in the real 
and in the simulated results, the oil slick travelled about 230 km in the selected 9 days.  This 




Figure 50: Actual distance covered by the oil slick in the selected 9 days. 
 
Figure 51: Distribution of oil spill assessed by the elliptical shapes computed according to the 
proposed model 
The dimensions of the impacted area, computed by eq. (12) to eq. (15), during the time 
horizon of 9 days, are listed in the table 43.  
The simulation of oil slick trajectory during the study period (9 days) is shown in the 
graphs in figure 52 which consists of consecutive elliptical shapes, whose dimensions appear 














Distance between the 
accident source point and 
the further point of the oil 
slick 
07-oct 3.6 6.27 2722.3 5694.8 8.70 
08-oct 10 9.14 3237.4 23049.2 37.58 
09-oct 8.05 11.44 3582.8 23851.5 50.31 
10-oct 12.22 13.45 3849.9 47169.0 97.21 
11-oct 8.05 15.28 4070.8 33802.1 100.74 
12-oct 3.88 16.98 4260.7 18078.1 94.06 
13-oct 4.72 18.57 4428.1 24000.5 111.98 
14-oct 9.44 20.09 4578.4 56563.1 172.82 
15-oct 12.77 21.54 4715.2 89038.3 249.82 
Figure 52 displays a map generated by a geographical information system (GIS) related 




















Figure 52: Trajectories of oil slick simulated by the model from October 7 to October 15, 




VI. Case Study: Strait of Gibraltar  
Due to its strategical position and its busy maritime traffic, represents the main maritime 
highway in West Mediterranean. The Strait occupies the space where the dense commercial 
traffic fueling between Europe and Asia intersects, revealing the historical links between 
Europe and Africa. These flows raise the Strait of Gibraltar to the ranks of the Straits of Pas de 
Calais or Malacca in terms of international maritime traffic (97,000 to 100,000 vessels per year) 
and, besides, the nature of these flows makes it an observatory area of global trade (Mareï, 
2012).  
In this study, it is assumed that oil spill models to simulate the evolution of an oil slick and 
to compute the related risk assessment are based on maritime accidents or accidental ship 
collisions which may occur in four different sites in the body of water of the Gibraltar Strait. 
The consequence models are tested to evaluate the impact of the simulated accident scenarios 
on 8 sensible Point of Interests (POIs) located on the African and European coast, namely 
Tanger, Port Tanger Med, Dalia beach, Oued Marsa beach, Ceuta for Africa, and Tarifa, 
Algéciras and Gibraltar for Europe. Figure 53 represents the geographical position of the 
selected potential accident test sites (ATSs) and the location of the sensible coastal locations 
(POIs). Table 44 shows the geographical coordinates of the ATSs and the related distances from 
the specific POIs on the Moroccan and Spanish coasts. In order to simulate the evolution of the 
oil slick, wind speed and wind directions data have been collected by REMRO database 
(REMRO, 2018). Those data related, as an example, to the ATS 1 appear in the table 45. 
Table 44: The distance among the ATSs and the coastal POIs. 




















 POI1  Tanger 24.56 36 38.5 46 
POI2  Port Tanger Med 12.42 9.19 10.46 17.22 
POI3  Dalia beach 13.84 7.25 8.13 14.78 
POI4  Oued Marsa 
beach 
16.64 7.63 7.56 12.71 





 POI6  Tarifa 6.34 12.87 14.77 23 
POI7  Algésiras 10 9.45 10.5 12.91 





Table 45: Annual distribution of wind direction and mean wind speed for ATS 1 
Direction 
average wind speed (m/s) 
≤ 1.0 3.0 6.0 9.0 12.0 15.0 18.0 21.0 >21.0 
Calm 1.056         
N  0.666 1.159 0.361 0.028 - - - - 
NNE  0.643 0.779 1.145 0.005 - - - - 
NE  0.620 0.948 0.122 0.019 - - - - 
ENE  0.554 1.952 1.638 0.671 0.155 0.005 - - 
E  0.634 3.731 7.824 8.406 4.581 1.572 0.347 - 
ESE  0.451 1.525 1.253 0.554 0.160 0.038 - - 
SE  0.399 0.742 0.164 0.023 - - - - 
SSE  0.399 0.549 0.169 0.047 0.005 - - - 
S  0.432 0.878 0.446 0.155 0.005 0.009 0.005 - 
SSW  0.577 1.197 0.986 0.634 0.183 0.094 0.009 - 
SW  0.840 2.647 1.492 0.882 0.451 0.066 0.009 - 
WSW  1.197 4.163 1.835 0.605 0.286 0.042 - - 
W  1.370 5.890 3.173 0.849 0.197 0.005 0.019 - 
WNW  1.352 6.251 2.816 0.807 0.169 0.052 - - 
NW  1.028 4.224 1.915 0.512 0.089 0.005 - - 
NNW  0.869 2.215 0.803 0.131 0.009 - - - 
 




VI.1. Model application 
In the proposed study, the yearly accident rate for the case study area, computed by eq. 3, 
is based on REMPEC accidents data related to accidents occurred in 40 years, from 1977 to 
2017, in Western Mediterranean Sea.  Thus  𝐴𝑅 = 7.83^ − 06  accident /yr km2.  
 The consequence analysis has been carried out taking into account the following 
conditions: 
- three release sizes have been defined (70, 700 and 7000 tons). Table 46 contains the 
𝑃𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 computed by eq.4 according to accident data in the period 1977–2017. 
- three 𝑈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 for 8 different directions (N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NE) are considered in 
simulations, namely 𝑈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 =1.5, 14 and 24 m/s. As an example, the probability of different 
combinations of atmospheric conditions for 𝑈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑=14 m/s in different ATSs are listed in 
table47.  
In the proposed simulations, the surface current in the four ATSs has been considered 
𝑈𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0.6 m/s  according to data coming from (Tsimplis et al., 2000; Perkins et al.,1990). 
Concerning the horizontal diffusion coefficient, the value 𝐷ℎ = 7 m^2/sec (Chao et al., 2001) 
has been adopted in the applications. 
Table 48 indicates the oil spill probability P computed by eq.2 as the combination of these 
three different components in case of the bigger release category of 700 Ton oil spilled. 
About 288 simulations have been carried out to evaluate the risk assessment on the 
sensible POIs sites on the African and European coasts. The simulations consist in four potential 
maritime accidents (ATS1, ATS2, ATS3, ATS4) with three spill categories (70, 700 and 7000 
tons), for three different wind speeds (1.5, 14 and 24 m/s) in eight wind directions. 
Table 46: P(spill size) computed according to the accident data in the period 1977-2017. 
Release size (Tons) Number of accident 𝑷𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 
70 261 6.92E-01 
700 72 1.91E-01 




Table 47: Probability of different combinations of atmospheric conditions for wind speed as 
14 m/s in 8 different directions. 
Wind speed m/s Direction 
Test sites 
ATS 1 ATS 2 ATS 3 ATS 4 
14 
N 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 
NNE 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 
NE 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 
ENE 1.00E-02 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 
E 2.10E-01 3.20E-02 3.20E-02 1.50E-02 
ESE 2.00E-02 3.00E-02 3.00E-02 3.00E-02 
SE 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 
SSE 5.00E-03 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 
S 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 
SSW 2.00E-02 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 
SW 2.00E-02 1.25E-02 1.25E-02 1.20E-02 
WSW 5.00E-03 3.00E-02 3.00E-02 2.00E-02 
W 1.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 1.00E-02 
WNW 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 
NW 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 5.00E-03 1.50E-02 














Wind speed (m/s) 
1.5 14 24 
PATS1 PATS2 PATS3 PATS4 PATS1 PATS2 PATS3 PATS4 PATS1 PATS2 PATS3 PATS4 
700 T 
N 1.72E-07 3.89E-07 3.89E-07 2.84E-07 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
NNE 1.35E-07 1.50E-07 1.50E-07 2.84E-07 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
NE 2.69E-07 2.09E-07 2.09E-07 5.98E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
ENE 5.98E-08 5.98E-08 5.98E-08 1.35E-07 1.50E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
E 1.35E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 3.14E-07 4.79E-08 4.79E-08 2.24E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
ESE 5.98E-08 2.84E-07 2.84E-07 2.09E-07 2.99E-08 4.49E-08 4.49E-08 4.49E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
SE 2.84E-07 4.34E-07 4.34E-07 3.59E-07 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
SSE 1.35E-07 2.99E-07 2.99E-07 2.24E-07 7.48E-09 1.50E-08 1.50E-08 1.50E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
S 2.69E-07 5.83E-07 5.83E-07 2.84E-07 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
SSW 5.98E-08 1.35E-07 1.35E-07 1.35E-07 2.99E-08 1.50E-08 1.50E-08 1.50E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
SW 1.72E-07 2.84E-07 2.84E-07 2.39E-07 2.99E-08 1.87E-08 1.87E-08 1.79E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
WSW 5.98E-08 5.98E-08 5.98E-08 1.50E-08 7.48E-09 4.49E-08 4.49E-08 2.99E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
w 2.99E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 1.50E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 1.50E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
WNW 5.98E-08 5.98E-08 5.98E-08 5.98E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 
NW 1.11E-06 1.35E-07 1.35E-07 1.35E-07 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 2.24E-08 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 7.48E-09 




VI.2. Consequence model simulations 
In this section, the simulation results for the three different spill release sizes have been 
presented and compared in relation to different meteorological conditions. 
The calculation of the impacted area 𝐴𝑡 computed by the model (5)-(15) for the three different 
release scenarios during the nine hours after the accident happened (wind speed =14 m/s) is lis
ted in table 49. Figure 54 displays the related graphical interpretation of the oil slick spreading 
Figure 55 and 56 represents the visualization, by a GIS, of a simulated scenario which 
concerns a maritime spill accident, occurred in the ATS4, with an estimated spill release of 700 
tons with 𝑈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 = 14 𝑚/𝑠 and wind direction Northeast-East (NE), and figure shows the 
estimation of a spill of 7000 tones rejection with 𝑈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 = 14 𝑚/𝑠, and a North-West wind 
direction (NW) occurred in the ATS1. (the others scenarios are in appendix 2) 
Table 49: The computation of the elliptical At spreading for the oil slick during 9 hours after 
the incident occurring 
Wind speed (m/s) Release size (Tons) Time (hours) 
* 
At (km2) Length Q (m) Length R (m) 
14 
700 
1 1.53 1346.36 3075.49 
2 2.23 1601.10 4509.14 
3 2.79 1771.91 5713.48 
4 3.28 1904.04 6794.76 
5 3.72 2013.28 7794.98 
6 4.13 2107.17 8736.07 
7 4.52 2189.96 9631.31 
8 4.88 2264.30 10489.48 
9 5.23 2331.97 11316.80 
7000 
1 6.71 2900.03 4629.16 
2 9.56 3448.74 6356.78 
3 11.76 3816.66 7758.23 
4 13.64 4101.27 8991.99 
5 15.31 4336.56 10118.26 
6 16.82 4538.80 11167.70 
7 18.23 4717.13 12158.47 
8 19.54 4877.26 13102.44 
9 20.78 5023.01 14007.84 
70 
1 0.41 625.72 2354.85 
2 0.65 744.11 3652.15 
3 0.85 823.49 4765.06 
4 1.04 884.90 5775.62 
5 1.22 935.67 6717.37 
6 1.40 979.30 7608.20 
7 1.56 1017.78 8459.13 
8 1.73 1052.33 9277.51 




Figure 54: Elliptical spreading of a surface slick for 700 T Tons spilled with wind speed 14m/s 
 
Figure 55: Estimated Spill location for 700 Tons from test point 4 with wind speed 14 m/s 






Figure 56: Estimated Spill location for 7000 Tons from test point 1 with wind speed 14 m/s 
(wind direction: NW) 
VI.3. Risk model application  
In order to evaluate the environmental risk due to coastal pollution occurring in the event 
of a spill accident, it is necessary to identify risk’s levels. In the proposed model, the potential 
environmental risk was assessed on the basis of the time required by the oil slick to reach the 
European and African coasts assuming that an oil spill accident may have occurred in one of 
the ATSs.  
The proposed Lagrangian-based maritime and coastal risk model can be used not merely 
in oil spill response and contingency planning but also in assessment risk impact. In the event 
of an oil spill, by a limited set of necessary meteorological data, the predictions of the slick 
movements and trajectories may be provided to the competent authorities. The main result of 
the proposed approach is the possibility to define a risk ranking for the coastal area based on 
the forecasted slick movements and to determine, under specified meteorological conditions, 
the time required by the oil slick to hit the littoral. 
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The tables 50 and 51 represent the estimated times (in hours) required by the oil spill to 
reach the POIs in the African and European coasts coming from the different ATSs off the Strait 
of Gibraltar according to different scenarios.  
Table 50: Time (hours) required by the oil slick to reach the POIs on the Moroccan coastile 
for accidents occurred in one of the ATSs. 
            
    
Release quantity 
    
70 T 700 T 7000T 


























P1  12 4.5 2.5 8 3.5 2.5 3.5 2 1.5 
P2  17.5 7 4 12 5 3.5 7 3.5 3 
P3 18.5 7.5 4 12.5 5 3.5 7.5 3.5 3 












P1  6 2 1 3.5 1.5 <1 2 <1 <1 
P2 4 1 <1 2 1 <1 1 <1 <1 
P3 4 1.5 <1 2.5 1 <1 1 <1 <1 








 P1 6 2 1 4 1.5 1 2 <1 <1 
P2 2 <1 <1 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
P3 2.5 <1 <1 1.5 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 










 P1 8 3 1.5 5 2.5 1.5 3 <1 <1 
P2 2 <1 <1 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
P3 2 <1 <1 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 





P1 14.5 5.5 3 9.5 4 2.5 5.5 2.5 2 
P2 8 3 1.5 5 2.5 1.5 3 <1 <1 
P3 7.5 2.5 1.5 4.5 2 1.5 2.5 <1 <1 




Table 51: Time (hours) required by the oil slick to reach the POIs on the Spanish coastile for 
accidents occurred in one of the ATSs. 
    
Release quantity 
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P1  1 <1 <1 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
P2  6 2 1 3.5 1.5 <1 2 <1 <1 
P3 7 2 1.5 4.5 2 1 2 <1 <1 







P1  4.5 1 <1 2 1 <1 1 <1 <1 
P2 4 1 <1 2 1 <1 1 <1 <1 
P3 4.5 1 <1 2.5 1 <1 1 <1 <1 







P1 14.5 5 3 9.5 4 2.5 6 2.5 2 
P2 10 3 2 6.5 2.5 1.5 3.5 1 1 
P3 9.5 3 2 6 2.5 1.5 3.5 1 1 
P4 7 2 1.5 4.5 2 1 2 <1 <1 
 
The oil spill risk assessment is measured considering the cumulative probability, related 
to the overall simulated scenarios, that the oil slicks reach the coastal POIs in the successive 
hour time slots after the beginning of the oil spill accident releases.  
Figures 57 and 58 represent, respectively, the coastal environmental risk for the selected 
African and European POIs. Among the selected POIs, Oued Mersa and Dalia represent the 
first locations to be affected in case of accidents in the Strait of Gibraltar in the first two hours. 
Besides, the region of Tarifa and Algeciras also appears to be subjected to a relevant risk on the 
European side.  
According to the timing, after 4 hours, Port Tangier Med and the beaches of Oued Mersa 
and Dalia beach, on the African Mediterranean coast, have the main probability to be hit by an 
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oil slick generated by maritime accidents in the study area. On the European side, the risk 
probability of oil beaching on the coasts, is growing, respectively, for Algeciras, Tarifa and 
Gibraltar.  
Due to the interaction between the wind flow and the orography of the coast, the Gibraltar 
strait is very windy. It is exposed mainly to two types of winds (BENALI, 2016; El Gharbaoui, 
1981): 
▪ East winds dominate in March and from July to October with a wind speed exceeding 
8 m / s is 22% of the day; 
▪ The west winds of Atlantic origin and important source of humidity and precipitation, 








Figure 58: Probability of having a spill accident in the European part (Spanish coasts). 
 
According to information provided by REMRO Network (REMRO Network, 2018) the 
wind in the test points ATS1 and ATS4 has direction East-South-East and West direction (ESE-
W) with a percentage of 53%, directed to European side, and direction West-North-West and 
East direction (WNW-E) in 47%. On the other hand, for the test points ATS2 and ATS3, the 
direction of the dominant winds, towards the Moroccan coast, is between WNW-E with a 
percentage of 61% (39% for ESE-W).  
The importance of the proposed model appears to be most obvious due to this wind 
variability. Thus, it represents an added value in the real time applications in case of maritime 
accidents. 
The intense maritime traffic can be considered as the cause behind the occurrence of 
several accidents at the main maritime routes with more than 325,000 trips in the Mediterranean 
Sea in 2007, representing a capacity of 3,800 million tons (REMPEC, 2018): along the main 
east-west axis connecting the Strait of Gibraltar and the various distribution branches of the 
eastern Mediterranean, via the Sicilian Channel and the Ionian Sea, and along the roads leading 
to the main ports of unloading of the coast north of the Adriatic, east of Corsica, also along the 
Ligurian Sea and around the Gulf of Lion (Ameer et al., 2008). 
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However, in recent years the typology of maritime accidents has undergone some 
changes. The number of disasters is declining. In most cases; these incidents result in small 
spills, yet, permanently, they cause many collisions, groundings and shipwrecks. 
We have observed that during the last 40 years (between 1977 and 2017), based on the 
980 accidents that occurred and recorded by REMPEC, almost 30% of the incidents (268 
accidents) involved oil. Nearly half of the accidents leading to large spills (over 7 tons) reported 
to REMPEC took place in the eastern Mediterranean (197 accidents, or 74% of accidents 
involving oil). The rest of the accidents occurred in the western Mediterranean (representing 
26% of the total). No accidents were reported at Strait of Gibraltar level. 
The eastern part of the Mediterranean is ranked first as an area vulnerable to maritime 
accidents, more specifically in the region of Greece. The causes of these incidents are 
numerous: 
▪ The high traffic of the maritime transport of goods; 
▪ The recreational maritime transport which has grown exponentially; 
▪ The Touristic traffic, which has experienced an extraordinary development especially 
cruise ship; 
▪ Traffic related to sea fishing activity. 
This traffic is located in a small part of the sea characterized by the presence of many 
islands. 
Compared to our study area in the Strait of Gibraltar, several factors make it possible to 
classify it as a zone of low number of accidents compared to other areas of the Mediterranean. 
Actually, the Strait is a transit route dedicated exclusively to East-West goods and an axis 
connecting passengers between Morocco and Spain. The Strait is rarely used for tourism and 
fishing activities. 
This reduction in the number of accidents is, in part, attributed to the GIBRALTAR Straits 
Surveillance and Aid to Maritime Navigation System (Tangier-Tarifa-Gibraltar). This system 
is dedicated to the surveillance of maritime traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar, where a Vessel 
Traffic Service (VTS) is located. 
It should be noted that most Mediterranean countries have ratified the international 
conventions dealing with the impact of ships on the environment (MARPOL, AFS, BWM). 
However, the actual state shows the non-application of international regulations by all 
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operators. Most of these Mediterranean countries have adopted a national emergency plan, and 
many of them have developed subregional contingency plans, and programs to train staff and 
the availability of specific equipment, as well as satellite monitoring programs. 
Indeed, this model can provide an extensive overvaluation of the spill zone, for the reason 


























The proposed risk model provides wide-ranging and fast information on the direction, 
spreading and magnitude of the oil spill, as well as it identifies the coastal areas which may be 
affected more or less quickly. This approach may be integrated with a GIS tool to generate 
detailed simulated maps on trajectories and oil slick spreading toward the relevant coasts. 
The proposed model has been applied to 288 significant scenarios generated considering 
four potential accident sites in the West Mediterranean Sea. The accident probability analysis 
is function of three components related to maritime oil spill accident frequency on the maritime 
routes included in the study area, probability of spill sizes, and a joint probability function of 
wind direction and speed. The consequences model related to the prediction of the oil slick 
trajectories and affected areas takes into consideration the spreading, the advection and the 
diffusion processes. To determine the oil spill path, data about the weather conditions and 
surface currents have been utilized.  
Risk assessment for the coastal POIs is based on the cumulative probability to be 
impacted by an oil spill, over the time, starting from the initial accident event.  
The main contribution of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, the model application ranks the 
coastal locations according to higher hazmat risk to be strongly affected by the oil spill in each 
time intervals. Secondly, the proposed model, connected to adequate ICT equipment to acquire 
in real time data on weather and sea currents represents a useful tool to manage the immediate 
containment and recovery activities. 
Eventually, the proposed model may underestimate the oil slick impact area since it does 
not encompass all the possible physical processes in the water column.  In the future 
development of the model, also dispersion, emulsification and dissolution phases may be taken 















Chapter V: Risk assessment related 
to the handling and storage of 















This study about risk assessment is conducted especially for a terminal of storage and 
distribution of hydrocarbons in the largest port in the North of Africa. 
This study in this chapter discusses the potential risks of facilities by describing the main 
likely accidents, their causes (internal or external), their nature and their consequences. This 
study includes a description of the facilities and the environment, as well as an analysis of the 
risks related to the facilities, products handled and the environment of the site. Hazardous 
phenomena identified during this risk analysis will be simulated in order to quantify their 
consequences on the facilities of the Establishment and the environment of the latter. It justifies 
measures to reduce the likelihood and effects of these accidents. It specifies the consistency and 
the means of internal or external rescue implemented in order to combat the effects of a possible 
disaster. 
This study must allow a rational and objective approach to the risks incurred by people 
or the environment. Our goal is the contribution made to the main objectives of the 
administration which are: 
▪ improve the reflection on the security inside the establishment in order to reduce the 
risks and optimize the prevention policy; 
▪ promote technical dialogue with the inspection authorities to take account of 
technical and organizational considerations; 
▪ provide, if necessary, constraints in terms of urban planning and land use in the 
vicinity of the facilities. 
The main activity of this terminal is the reception of hydrocarbons, their storage and them 
redistribution via loading stations trucks and wagons. To achieve this end, the terminal has the 
following technical data (Figure 59): 
▪ Area of 12 ha; 
▪ Storage capacity of 508 000 m3 distributed in 19 tanks; 
▪ Stored products: Gasoline, gasoline additives (MTBE + Ethanol), Diesel; 
▪ Marine Diesel, fuel oil, heavy fuel oil and additives for fuel oil. 
In addition to the tanks, the terminal has the following infrastructures: 
▪ 2 piers 3 km from the terminal receiving vessels of up to 120,000 m3; 




▪ 12 '' pipe for fire water; 
▪ 6 truck loading station; 
▪ 1 post loading wagons. 
The identification of the hazards was made through a careful study of the feedback of 
experience in similar installations as well as by the examination of the Material Safety Data 
Sheets (MSDS) of the products which could be present on the site. 
The main dangers related to this company have been identified at two levels: 
A. Intrinsic hazards related to products: All hydrocarbons present in the establishment 
are classified as flammable. As already indicated in the 1st chapter, the flammability of a 
product is defined in particular by its flash point. For example, certain products such as gasoline 
emit vapors at room temperature, while diesel or heating oil requires a moderate pre-heating to 
reveal the first flammable vapors. 
Regarding the risk of pollution, although intrinsically biodegradable, hydrocarbons when 
discharged in large quantities are potentially dangerous for the soil or the aquatic environment. 
B. Activity Risk Analysais : 
This risk analysis covers, in the case of our study, the terminal as well as the pier (loading 
arms on the pier to the storage bins or loading stations). These facilities were subject to a risk 
analysis at two levels: 
▪ A preliminary risk analysis to identify major risks, 
▪ A detailed analysis to characterize the critical scenarios more precisely. 
It turns out that the risks that an oil depot can pose are two-fold: 
▪ A fire, following a hydrocarbon leak and its ignition, 
▪ An explosion inside a tank, or an ignition of a cloud of gas following a leak and the 





Figure 59: Plan of the three existing tank farms 
I. Presentation of the QRA methodology  
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is deemed to be the advancement of a quantitative 
estimation of hazards based on engineering assessment and math calculations by mixing 
estimate of occurrence results and frequencies (Hassan et al.,  2009). This means that the QRA 
not only could present a general hazard evaluation but it also has the ability to show the 
relational connection between the incident frequency and results. 
QRA method, evolved for the Chemical (CCPS, 2008), presents a 3-dimension evaluation 
in which the axes represent the three main factors that outline the scope of a QRA. A person 
can perform a restrained, generalized or designated set of danger estimation and, present day, 
she/he can perform a qualitative, semi-quantitative, or quantitative hazard evaluation. To clarify 
more, the representation of estimation with the aid of outcome, frequency, and hazard is 
indicative of the level of maturity of those strategies.  
To put it differently, the practical application of those well-known processes to compute 
hazard assessment gives rise to various problematic issues. The predominant parameters of the 
QRA concerned in estimating the frequency and the effects of the accident eventualities, for 
example accident rate, exposure quantification and the release probability.  
The only option in this case is to increase a representative model of the risks associated 
to the system. Since that exists a limitless wide variety of opportunities that risky effects may 
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additionally expand it's far impossible to assess all feasible conditions; therefore, the evaluation 
is limited to a confined wide variety of selected representative situations. It should constantly 
keep in mind that threat analysis is a model primarily based on preconditions and assumptions 
and isn't a replica of truth (Massimo et al., 2013). Nevertheless, threat evaluation provides a 
much better understanding of threat associated tactics than merely revel in-primarily based 
ideas. 
This is a systemic method to investigate sequences and interrelations in capability 
incidents or injuries, considering the occasions logic chain, essential dangerous events and 
undesired consequences. The version makes the quantification of risks establishing the idea of 
a performance-based totally approach for the evaluation of safety standards. 
The solutions of this analysis allow to check the overall consistency of safety making 
plans, to choose among alternatives layout answers, to demonstrate that safety requirements are 
fulfilled, Nowadays the protection for humans in many nations is completed on the basis of 
prescriptive policies: 
A prescriptive requirement specifies precise protection capabilities, actions or 
programmatic factors to be protected within the design of technical device, as the manner for 
achieving a desired intention. The implementation of these requirements needs to be carried out 
more or less without thinking about the person traits of a building or commercial manner 
(Massimo et al., 2013). 
The technique of quantitative probabilistic chance evaluation contributes to outline a 
proactive technique to safety useful to quantify the potential risks overcoming and integrating 
the based totally method at the learned ideas via accident took place yet. 
In the proposed approach, the risk (R) is associated to the expected value of the 
probability (P) of an accident occurrence of the consequences arising given the occurrence of a 
hazmat accident. The risk (R) is defined as probability (P) times consequence (C) (CCPS, 
2008). 
I.1. Frequency analysis 
Frequency analysis as indicated in chapter 2 is implies the computation of two main 
components: the probability that the undesirable Initiating Event (IE) may occur and the 
probability of hazmat outcome after the IE. The hazard outcome case represents the physical 
manifestation of the incident scenario i.e. jet-fire, pool fire, or toxic cloud in case of toxic 
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product transportation. The frequency analysis for IE includes the computation of the estimated 
accident rate (per year) for the specific logistic operation. The task to compute the accident rate 
requires a large amount of accident data. 
In the proposed approach, the accident frequency comes from statistical data of accidents 
of the breaking occasions of the plant and/or system transfer to be able to deduce the chance of 
occurrence for the forms of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) and to evaluate the quantitative 
threat indicators. (Massimo et al., 2013; LEES, 2012). 
The reasons of beginning events assumed for the gasoline plant, typically talk over with 
historical analysis of accidents related to (Massimo et al., 2013): 
▪ The catastrophic ruin of the storage tank; 
▪ The partial destruction of the storage tank; 
▪ The overall destruction of the transfer products pipes; 
▪ The partial destruction of the transfer products pipes; 
▪ The leak from a gasket of the coupling flange. 
The table 52 represents the probability of occurrence of the initiating event based on the 
available databases for the plan of the petroleum products based on worldwide records series 
from global databases (LEES, 2012). 
Table 52: Probability of incidental events occurrence 
 Event Diameter (mm) 
<50 50-150 >150 
Frequency 
(Occasions/year) 
The catastrophic ruin of the storage tank. 3.0E-06 





The overall destruction of the transfer products 
pipes 1.0E-10 3.0E-11 1.0E-11 
The partial destruction of the transfer products 
pipes 1.0E-09 6.4E-10 3.0E-11 
The leak from a gasket of the coupling flange 5.0E-08 
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With the goal of presenting a technical scientific standardized version relevant for similar 
contexts, the activities were normalized with respect to appropriate space-time body and that 
they were standardized with respect to the actual size of the plant. Starting from the initiating 
activities, we proceeded to the particular reconstruction of individual scenarios by way of the 
event tree evaluation. This method is based totally at the graphical representation of a logical 
version which identifies the evolution of incidental speculation. In order to define the outcomes 
of incidental events, it is far suitable to define the scale of the spillage, which determines the 
amount of the substance inside the environment. The flow price in the liquid segment turned 
into calculated by using application of the discharge models, based at the equation of 
mechanical strength stability (Massimo et al., 2013; BOSCH et al., 2005) 
In case of leakage of a liquid product, the pushing force is typically the strain and the 
stress energy are converted to kinetic power throughout the release. The flow rate of released 
fluid depends not on the dimensions of the hollow (or the hole from which the leak happens). 
However, it also occurs due to different elements such as the density of the fluid, the share of 
the liquid head, the initial and final cost of the spilled fluid, the sum of phrases associated with 
the weight losses and the speed of leakage of fluid from the hollow. The size of the entire launch 
is associated with the period of the spill. The duration of the outflow is defined via summing 
the desired time to come across the leak (alarm time) and the specified time to interfere 
operatively and to prevent the release. 
◼ The Event Tree Analysis 
The Event Tree Analysis indicates all capacity evolutionary paths of a starting up event, which 
range in relation to residual danger associated with the impact of the designed safety capabilities 
to protect the system. The Events Trees, advanced because the compliant initiating occasions 
for the plant, are composed of the following analytical steps: 
• determination of the initiating event; 
• identification of the protection features; 
• production of the event tree; 
• evaluation and analysis of the effects. 
The starting up event, chosen to demonstrate the Event Tree diagram, is the “Catastrophic ruin 
of the gasoline storage tank” with a twin purpose: 
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• To display the method by way of which it makes the analysis of the bodily-chemical 
occasion and the quantification of the probability of prevalence; 
• To exhibit the opportunity to perform the risk analysis for the event “Catastrophic 
destroy of the tank” although it is characterized through incidental eventualities that 
have a low chance of prevalence. 
It is cited that a “catastrophic wreck” it is deemed to be a rupture of massive size, which could 
cause the leakage of all the product. 
The containment basin, current inside the plant, has such dimensions to keep all of the 
liquid contained in the tank. The tanks are ready with level manipulation system, which allows 
to check any time the real degree of the liquid. The leakage can be in reality detected and the 
launched product can be transferred into appropriate volumes of containment. The possibility 













I.2. Consequence analysis in the proposed approach 
The hazard evaluation, associated with the generated risky events, assumes that, given 
the characteristics of the substance, it is recognized the complete institution of the initiating 
event and for each event. 
The dangerous outcomes of a chemical incidental event invest with lowering severity the 
encompassing area, depending on the space from the ignition supply, except if a domino impact 
occurs. 
A fireplace can motive limited direct damage to uncovered character inside the proximity 
place (radiation, poisonous combustion merchandise). 
The explosions, alternatively, have continually consequences in terms of stress wave. 
Depending on the explosion length, effects related to the splinters and on the 
improvement of warmth and combustion products may also arise. 
For the representation of the harm regions, concerned by way of the prevalence of the 
incidental scenarios, reference became made to the related threshold values in Italian 
Ministerial Decree May 9th, 2001 "Pianificazione del territorio e rischio tecnologico" (Italian 
Ministerial, 2001). Minimum safety requirements referring to city and territorial planning for 
the affected areas with the aid of the fundamental coincidence hazard plants- (Table 53). 
Table 53: Threshold values of reference 
(source: Italian Ministerial Decree May 9th, 2001) 
The carried-out simulations to quantify the threat of described incidental situations 
through the Event Tree, represent substantial situations of dispersion, of spills and consequent 
propagation of the pool with feasible immediately cause of the product (Pool-Fire) or behind 
schedule trigger of flammable vapor cloud (Flash Fire) or explosion of Unconfined Vapor 
Cloud (UVCE). 
FIRE 
(Steady thermal radiation) 
12,5 kW/m2 7 kW/m2 5 kW/m2 3 kW/m2 12,5 kW/m2 
BLEVE/Fireball 
(Variable thermal radiation) 
Raggio del fireball 350 kJ/m2 200 kJ/m2 125 kJ/m2 200/800 m  
Flash-fire 
(Snapshot thermal radiation) 




(0,6 bar spazi aperti) 
0.14 bar 0.07 bar 0.03 bar 0.3 bar 
Toxic release 
LC50 
(30 min, hmn) 
- IDHL   
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The incidental eventualities, because of the discharge into the surroundings and the 
subsequent ignition of gasoline, are: 
 Pool-Fire: trigger of a launched liquid substance in restricted area or not This event 
normally produces the hearth of the ‘pool’ from which it can derive a radiation 
phenomenon and smoke emission. The effects are related to the radiant heat that hits the 
target. The threshold values are expressed as thermal energy incident for unit of exposed 
surface (kW/m2); 
 Flash-Fire: bodily phenomenon attributable to the not on time ignition of a flammable 
vapors cloud produced through the leakage substance. 
The flash fire has a wonderful heat flux in a short time interval, generally much less than 
three sec. Occasional events of lethality can concomitantly occur with any isolated pockets and 
local flame, probably also gift over the decrease flammability restriction, due to possible 
nonhomogeneity of the cloud.  
In the case of formation of a flammable liquid pool that doesn’t locate immediately 
ignition, the liquid vaporizes from the puddle and creates a flammable cloud. The consequences 
of reason of the flammable substance cloud (gas or vapor) are represented through the 
immediately thermal radiation. 
The flammable cloud is the entire region wherein the attention of the flammable-air 
combination is above the lower flammability restrict. The flammable cloud is a part of the air-
flammable combination at recognition above the decrease flammability restrict or at half of that 
rate. 
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE): not restrained launch within the 
surroundings to a flammable substance within the gas phase or vapor from variables effects of 
temperature and overpressure. 
The threshold price for extended deadly effects, refers on the indirect lethality because of 
falls, throws the frame of limitations, influences of splinters and particularly disintegrate of 
buildings (0.3 bar), whilst, in unconfined regions (without homes or different vulnerable 
structures) it can be suitable to recall simplest the direct lethality, generated by the shock waves 
such (0.6 bar). 
The limit cost for irreversible and reversible accidents are basically associated with the 
distance to which the projection of splinters, even light, generated by the surprise wave are 
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anticipated. With regard to the domino effect, the threshold rate (0.3 bar) emerge as fixed 
consistent with commonplace distance of the splinters projection that might purpose harm at 
tanks, gadget, piping. 
II. Case study: application of the proposed methodology on oil Terminal 
The proposed case study consists of defining the risks for hazmat storage incurred by 
people or the environment in oil terminal - Morocco 
The main activity of this terminal is the reception of hydrocarbons, their storage and them 
redistribution via loading stations trucks and wagons. To achieve this end, the terminal has the 
following technical data (Figure 59): 
▪ Area of 12 ha; 
▪ Storage capacity of 508,000 m3 distributed in 19 tanks; 
▪ Stored products: Gasoline, gasoline additives (MTBE + Ethanol), Diesel; 
▪ Marine Diesel, fuel oil, heavy fuel oil and additives for fuel oil. 
In addition to the Gasoline tanks, the terminal has the following infrastructures: 
Table 54: Gasoline tank infrastructure 
Pipe diameter 
(inches) 
Length of the 
Line (m) 
N° Flanges N° Tanks 
Operating Time 
(hours /year) 
16 2700 37 3 8472 
II.1. Frequency analysis for the case study 
The value of probability to be attributed to the different types of ignition was obtained by the 








Table 55: The occurrence frequency of the initiating events of the analyzed plant 




The catastrophic ruin of the 
storage tank. 
3.00E-06 9.00E-06 






The overall destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
1.00E-11 2.29E-04 
The partial destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
3.00E-11 6.86E-04 




From where it is concluded that the leakage detection and the resultant drainage can 
happen only if the leakage can be detected by the responsible who is in charge of the control 
phase and supervision or if concurrently the proper functioning of the extent indicator and the 
operator of the remote control detects the leakage arise. 
The probability of the release detection, obtained by the Fault Tree Analysis, is 9.21E-01 while 
the complementary probability that represents the not detection of the spillage is 7.90E-02. 
The figures 61 to 65 shows the event Tree Analysis for the scenarios studied: 
 




Figure 62: Event Tree Analysis- The partial destruction of the storage tank; 
 
Figure 63: Event Tree Analysis- The overall destruction of the transfer products pipes 




Figure 64: Event Tree Analysis- The partial destruction of the transfer products pipes 
(Diameter of the pipe 16”) 
Figure 65: Event Tree Analysis- The leak from a gasket of the coupling flange. 
If all the systems failed, the consequent scenarios would be: 
▪ Pool-Fire: immediate trigger and burning of the pool; 
▪ Flash-Fire: delayed trigger of a cloud of flammable vapors; 




The occurrence probability of the complete group of incidental scenarios, compatible with the 
initiating events, are reported in the following table: 











Probability of the 



















ruin of the 
storage tank. 
--- 9.00E-06 900 0.05 0.07 0.12 
Pool-Fire 4.50E-07 








--- 9.00E-05 900 0.03 0.07 0.12 
Pool-Fire 2.70E-06 








16 2.29E-04 60 0.05 0.07 0.1 
Pool-Fire 1.14E-05 








16 6.86E-04 180 0.05 0.07 0.12 
Pool-Fire 3.43E-05 




The leak from 

































III.2. Consequence analysis for the case study 
After having identified the eventualities that may arise from the incidental occasion, we 
proceeded to quantify the areas of capability harm with a purpose to symbolize the risks degree 
of the system. The length of the predicted ability harm regions from the evolution of incidental 
scenarios was quantified the usage of this machine Aerial Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres 
(ALOHA), which has allowed us to define the vulnerability of the territory. 
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The Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) device has been implemented 
to generate effect place of a coincidence on street related to fuel product. The information 
required to model the accident outcome case with Aloha software program seem in the Table 
that follows: 
Table 57: Data required by aloha to simulate hazmat scenario for the case study associate to 
Gasoline 
CLASS Of DATA TYPE OF DATA VALUES 
SITE DATA 
Location : HTT SA TANGIER Med, MOROCCO 
Building Air Exchanges Per 
Hour: 
0.50 (enclosed office) 
Time: July 24, 2017 1258 hours ST (user specified) 
CHEMICAL DATA 
Chemical Name: Gasoline 
ERPG-1 200 ppm 
ERPG -2 1000 ppm 
ERPG -3 4000 ppm 
IDLH 5 mg/m3 
LEL 14000 ppm 
UEL 74000 ppm 
Ambient Boiling Point: 125.4  C 
ATMOSFERIC 
DATA 
(Manual Input of 
Data)  
Wind / Stability 
Scenario I: 1.5 m/s (from EST) / (F: Moderately 
stable conditions) 
Scenario II: 14 m/s  (from EST) / (D: Neutral 
conditions) 
Ground Roughness: open country 
Cloud Cover : 5 tenths 
Air Temperature (C) 
Scenario I: Average minimum temperature: 13 
Scenario II: Average minimum temperature: 21 
Relative Humidity : 70% 
Description : 
Tank contains liquid 
Leak from hole in horizontal cylindrical tank 








The different scenarios have been simulated in ALOHA considering two different 
weather atmospheric conditions (F and D) and for two kinds of wind speed (1.5 and 14 m/sec).  
The different distances for different scenarios obtained represented in the following 
tables. The figures 66 & 67 represent an example of the hazard zones for the different scenarios 
for the catastrophic ruin of the storage tank computed by Aloha (the others scenarios are 
attached in Appendix 3). 





POOL-FIRE Distance from the release source 
(In the wind direction) (m) 
12.5 kW/m2 7 kW/m2 5 kW/m2 3 kW/m2 
The catastrophic ruin of the 
storage tank. 
F : 1.5m/s 196 261 307 392 
D : 14m/s 219 275 315 388 
The partial destruction of the 
storage tank; 
F : 1.5m/s 39 54 65 84 
D : 14m/s 51 62 70 84 
The overall destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
F : 1.5m/s 120 162 191 244 
D : 14m/s 139 173 197 242 
The partial destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
F : 1.5m/s 25 35 45 56 
D : 14m/s 35 42 47 56 
The leak from a gasket of the 
coupling flange 
F : 1.5m/s 25 29 33 39 












Table 59: Flammable Threat zone distance from the release source expressed in meters. 
Event Stability / Wind Speed 
FLASH-FIRE Distance 
LEL ½ LEL 
The catastrophic ruin of the 
storage tank. 
F : 1.5m/s 76 103 
D : 14m/s 85 100 
The partial destruction of the 
storage tank; 
F : 1.5m/s 23 33 
D : 14m/s 27 44 
The overall destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
F : 1.5m/s 84 110 
D : 14m/s 99 129 
The partial destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
F : 1.5m/s <10 12 
D : 14m/s 17 29 
The leak from a gasket of the 
coupling flange 
F : 1.5m/s <10 <10 
D : 14m/s 12 20 
 








UVCE Distance from the release 
source (In the Wind direction) (m) 
0,3 0,14 0,07 
The catastrophic ruin of the 
storage tank. 
---- 
F : 1.5m/s 74 88 127 
D : 14m/s 78 93 123 
The partial destruction of the 
storage tank; 
---- 
F : 1.5m/s 20 29 44 
D : 14m/s 27 39 62 
The overall destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
16 
F : 1.5m/s 51 71 104 
D : 14m/s 50 61 86 
The partial destruction of the 
transfer products pipes 
16 
F : 1.5m/s <10 <10 15 
D : 14m/s 17 26 40 
The leak from a gasket of the 
coupling flange 
16 
F : 1.5m/s <10 <10 11 
D : 14m/s 11 17 27 
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Figure 66 Hazard zones for the different scenarios for the catastrophic ruin of the storage 





Figure 67: hazard zones for the different scenarios for the catastrophic ruin of the storage tank 




II.2. QRA application 
The probability of the incidental scenarios and the evaluation of the potential damage 
areas allow to define the hazard level of the system. 
For comparative analysis has been assumed an evenly distributed and constant crowding 
of the damage areas, equal to 0.01 exposed/m2 (Massimo et al., 2013). 
The damage areas extension and the expected value of the damage (fatalities and injuries) 
for different scenarios are summarized in Table following (61 to 63). 
 









































Expected value of damage 
Fatalities/year Injuries/year 
catastrophic break of 
the storage tank 
F: 1.5m/s 68121 153664 
4.50E-07 
2218 681 1537 3.07E-04 6.91E-04 
D: 14m/s 87025 150544 2376 870 1505 3.92E-04 6.77E-04 
Partial break of the 
storage tank 
F: 1.5m/s 2916 7056 
2.70E-06 
100 29 71 7.87E-05 1.91E-04 
D: 14m/s 3844 7056 109 38 71 1.04E-04 1.91E-04 
Total break of the pipe 
/Mete (75mm) 
F: 1.5m/s 26244 59536 
1.14E-05 
858 262 595 2.99E-03 6.79E-03 
D: 14m/s 29929 58564 885 299 586 3.41E-03 6.68E-03 
Partial break of the pipe 
/Mete (75mm) 
F: 1.5m/s 1225 3136 
3.43E-05 
44 12 31 4.20E-04 1.08E-03 
D: 14m/s 1764 3136 49 18 31 6.05E-04 1.08E-03 
Breaking of the gasket 
of coupling flange 
F: 1.5m/s 841 1521 
4.70E-04 
24 8 15 3.95E-03 7.15E-03 


























Expected value of damage 
Fatalities/year Injuries/year 
catastrophic break of 
the storage tank 
F: 1.5m/s 5776 10609 
4.49E-08 
1639 578 1061 2.59E-05 4.76E-05 
D: 14m/s 7225 10000 1723 723 1000 3.24E-05 4.49E-05 
Partial break of the 
storage tank 
F: 1.5m/s 529 1089 
4.59E-07 
162 53 109 2.43E-05 5.00E-05 
D: 14m/s 729 1936 267 73 194 3.35E-05 8.89E-05 
Total break of the 
pipe /Mete (75mm) 
F: 1.5m/s 7056 12100 
1.14E-06 
1916 706 1210 8.04E-04 1.38E-03 
D: 14m/s 9801 16641 2644 980 1664 1.12E-03 1.90E-03 
Partial break of the 
pipe /Mete (75mm) 
F: 1.5m/s 100 144 
3.42E-06 
24 10 14 3.42E-05 4.92E-05 
D: 14m/s 289 841 113 29 84 9.88E-05 2.88E-04 
Breaking of the 
gasket of coupling 
flange 
F: 1.5m/s 100 100 
7.99E-05 
20 10 10 7.99E-04 7.99E-04 


























Expected value of damage 
Fatalities/year Injuries/year 
catastrophic 
break of the 
storage tank 
F: 1.5m/s 7744 16129 
2.84E-10 
2387 774 1613 2.20E-07 4.58E-07 
D: 14m/s 8649 15129 2378 865 1513 2.46E-07 4.30E-07 
Partial break of 
the storage tank 
F: 1.5m/s 841 1936 
2.90E-09 
278 84 194 2.44E-07 5.61E-07 
D: 14m/s 1521 3844 537 152 384 4.41E-07 1.11E-06 
Total break of 
the pipe /Mete 
(75mm) 
F: 1.5m/s 5041 10816 
7.21E-09 
1586 504 1082 3.63E-06 7.80E-06 
D: 14m/s 3721 7396 1112 372 740 2.68E-06 5.33E-06 
Partial break of 
the pipe /Mete 
(75mm) 
F: 1.5m/s 100 225 
2.16E-08 
33 10 23 2.16E-07 4.86E-07 
D: 14m/s 676 1600 228 68 160 1.46E-06 3.46E-06 
Breaking of the 
gasket of 
coupling flange 
F: 1.5m/s 100 121 
5.04E-07 
22 10 12 5.04E-06 6.10E-06 





This proposed method yielded similar results with the study of risks carried out by the 
company. where we take for example the scenario of "The overall destruction of the transfer 
products pipes " which classified according to the matrix of criticality used by the company, 
like a scenario of disastrous gravity. 
The company masters a lot of measures in terms of safety and prevention, for example 
the traffic plan at the terminal and the prevention of mechanical shocks, as well as the 
verification of the effectiveness of anti-explosion ripe and thermal screens with respect to this 
scenario and their upgrading if necessary. 
The proposed approach could improve the safety of a hazardous materials storage facility 
by minimizing worker and population exposure by optimizing hazardous materials planning. 
Petroleum terminals could apply this methodology to define the risks in the facility for the 
















Conclusion and perspectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to propose a systemic approach to risk assessment, taking into 
account in a global way the risks related to hazardous materials throughout different modality. 
In this context, the first issue addressed in this thesis is to assess the level of risk of 
hazardous goods transport areas for both road and marine modes of transportation, while the 
second issue of assessing risks in an industrial facility fixed. 
In order to determinate the problems in the Moroccan logistic system related to hazardous 
materials, which we have chosen as a case study, to apply different approaches proposed, we 
conducted a survey involving several companies used, transport or storage these materials.  
The exploratory research we have conducted can pave the way for a wide variety of 
development perspectives. Among other things, the possibility of developing a guide to good 
practices for carriers to inform them of the practices they can put in place to reduce their risk, 
or the possibility of making many recommendations to different ministries in relation to the 
training, the use of equipment, accident register policies, or even mount communication 
campaigns to raise awareness of the risks of multi-client carriers and multiple loading / 
unloading operations. 
The proposed approach could improve the hazmat road transport safety minimizing the 
population exposure by optimizing the scheduling of hazmat vehicle shipments in the planning 
phase. Hazmat operators could apply this methodology to define the routes at minimum risk. 
On the other hand, the possibility to evaluate FN curves according to risk acceptance criteria 
might provide basis for decisions on the implementation of risk-reducing measures. 
In the industrial context, the utility of the adoption of QRA decision tool for risk 
management is often underestimated. QRA could provide informed assessment of cost risk 
exposures with special relevance in the hazmat transportation context. Besides, it is able to offer 
significant data to define mitigation risk strategies. 
The use of the proposed basic approach allows the user to carry out a speed QRA 
obtaining still significant risk values. In a real-time or operational decisional level framework, 
reliable data about risk, even if approximated, could be very suitable to identify immediately 
the value of risk for a hazmat accidental event. 
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Anyway, at tactical and strategical decisional level, QRA for hazmat transport deserves 
to be analyzed with more detailed multi-criteria models, enabling a deeper analysis of the 
problem. This simple approach can be applied and disseminated throughout Morocco for risk 
mapping in various regions concerning HM. This helps in making the decision for the 
authorities as well as the response teams in case of an incident. 
On the other hand, the proposed maritime risk model provides wide-ranging and fast 
information on the direction, spreading and magnitude of the oil spill, as well as identifies the 
coastal areas which may be affected more or less quickly through to generate detailed simulated 
maps on trajectories and oil slick spreading toward the relevant coasts. This approach may 
represent a useful tool to manage immediate containment and recovery activities. 
The applicability of the method to another study area is quite satisfactory. In the future 
development of the model, also evaporation, dispersion, emulsification and dissolution phases 
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The FN curves have been calculated for the different scenarios studied 
 
UVCE scenario with large spill size of Gasoline located in the Tangier 
 













Pool fire scenario with large spill size of Gasoline located in the Tétouan. 
 




UVCE scenario with large spill size of Gasoline located in the Tétouan. 
 
 
















The simulated scenarios which concern a maritime spill accident in the 
different tests points in Strait of Gibraltar 
 
 
Elliptical spreading of a surface slick for 70 T; 700 T and 7000 Tones spilled with no wind or 
current. 
 
Estimated Spill location for 70 Tons with wind speed 1.5, 14 and 24 m/s 
Estimated Spill location for 700 Tons with wind speed 1.5, 14 and 24 m/s 
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Estimated Spill location for 7000 Tons with wind speed 1.5, 14 and 24 m/s. 
 
Estimated Location of the 70T Spill to Moroccan Coasts 
 
 
















Different incident scenarios computed by Aloha 
hazard zones for the different scenarios for the partial destruction of the transfer products 




hazard zones for the different scenarios for the overall destruction of the leak from a gasket of 





hazard zones for the different scenarios for partial the partial destruction of the storage tank 
computed by Aloha 
